122 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
122 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
The '''Zambian Copperbelt Strike of
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[1935](Timeline_of_Libertarian_Socialism_in_Southern_Africa "wikilink")
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'''was a [strike](List_of_Strikes "wikilink") by copperminers over high
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[taxes](Taxation "wikilink") and safety concerns in copper miners.
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## Background
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Nor
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By 1924, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was administered and occupied by
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the British government as an official British protectorate. While the
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Colonial Office headed administration, a group of interconnected
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companies financed by Britain, South Africa, and the United States came
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to control what became the ‘Copperbelt’ in Northern Rhodesia. Copper was
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becoming more valuable due to increased demand for electrical components
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and motors and regional deposits were easy to extract and profitably
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attracted investors.
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During the decade leading up to the strike, the Northern Rhodesian
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Copperbelt was booming, especially the mines of Rhokana (Nkana),
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Mufulira, Roan Antelope (Luanshya), and Nchanga. By 1930, up to 32,000
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workers were employed in mining operations in Northern Rhodesia. White
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artisans and middle level management had been recruited from South
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Africa and Britain, while black African laborers and miners came from
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all over Central Africa.
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Work conditions were very poor for all miners and there were deep wage
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inequalities between white and black mineworkers. Black mineworkers were
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practically barred from working skilled and many semi-skilled jobs due
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to the privileging of such roles for whites. Conditions in the mines
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themselves were deplorable, with high rates of silica-based diseases.
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African workers lived in company compounds, which were very cramped,
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basic, and uncomfortable. There was a permanent group of urban
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unemployed, and, finally, physical abuse often took place in the
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workplace and mine compounds.
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In May 1935, black African mineworkers experienced a reduction of
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industrial wages following a sudden ‘native tax’ increase for those
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living in urban areas. The tax increase came at a time when demand for
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labor was falling and black worker mobility was becoming more difficult
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as white farmers were taking opportunities for agricultural production.
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## Events
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On May 20, notices were posted at the Roan Antelope mine alerting
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mineworkers of the tax increase. At Rhokana, no public notice was given;
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only when miners went to government offices to pay taxes were they
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informed of the increase. However, in Mufulira, mine police shouted the
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news around the compound to inform the miners. It was the Mufulira mine
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where mineworkers struck first. The following days were filled with
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organizing activity, general work stoppages, and mass meetings of
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protest. By May 23, mine management claimed to have the ‘situation under
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control.’ The provincial administration had acted immediately, detaining
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those it considered to be strike leaders. However, some lead organizers
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escaped to Rhokana, where the next stoppage occurred.
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On May 25, workers at Rhokana gave notice of intent to strike. Two days
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later the strike began, even after at least 75 men were arrested and
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imprisoned between the announcement and the strike. The day of the
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strike, troops were flown from Lusaka to patrol the mine compound.
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Feeling their act of protest was made sufficiently during the day, night
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shift mineworkers showed up to work as normal.
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The next day, May 28, a worker from Rhokana was caught distributing
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leaflets to fellow mineworkers at Roan Antelope. It was soon discovered
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that miners were planning to strike there the following morning. In
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response, management requested more troops be sent to the mine. The next
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day eighty askari (local soldiers serving in European armies) arrived
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from Rhokana and immediately began attacking strikers with batons.
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Striking miners responded by throwing stones and sticks, at times
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advancing toward compound managers, assistants, and askari. Ultimately,
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the police opened fire on the strikers, killing six men and wounding
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twenty-two, shocking both sides.
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In contrast to the scene at Roan Antelope, strikers in Mufulira were in
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lighter spirits. There, strikers protested in groups, congregated around
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compound offices, and shared occasional laughter. When the District
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Officer tried to address the strikers from atop his car he was shouted
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down by the strikers. He read the riot act aloud, ordering the strikers
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to disperse. When nearby askari were called to march into the strikers,
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the strikers scattered. A compound assistant present at the scene
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recalls, “everyone just ran, cleared the square in no time. It wasn't
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unpleasant at all, a lot of laughter from the strikers, a lot of
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jeering” (Perrings 1977, p. 47).
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Back at Roan, the askari were withdrawn and replaced by a contingent of
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military police. The strikers continued to demonstrate on the 30th, but
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on that night forty-four of the supposed lead organizers were seized and
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sent to Ndola. The following day, most of the strikers returned to work.
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## Background
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Even though renewed calls for work stoppage and written protests against
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the tax were made at Rhokana and Mufulira in late July, it was the end
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of the 1935 strike. Several sources indicate that the Bemba people (who
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made up the largest percentage of workers) provided much of the
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leadership in the strikes of 1935 (Henderson; Perrings 1977, 1979;
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Steele). A Bemba dance association, the Mbeni, was the main organizing
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hub for disseminating news, rumors, and instructions among strikers.
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Other forms of worker associations and regional groupings formed to help
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miners cope with life on the compounds. Many held regular collections
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for funds for self-help and general community support, including death
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and burial practices. Groups such as these among mineworkers may have
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contributed similarly to organization of the strike.
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The conclusion of the strikes in Northern Rhodesia was followed by a
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commission of enquiry under the colonial administration. Obscuring the
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fundamental causes of the strike, the commission concluded the tax
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increase was ‘fair and reasonable’ and therefore inadequate grounds for
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strike action. The commission did acknowledge the existence of corporal
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punishment at Mufulira as a ‘cause’ of the strike, formed some oversight
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committees, and even dismissed an unpopular compound manager, but no
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fundamental change was made in the working conditions or status of black
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African mineworkers.
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After another wave of strikes in 1940, no comparable demonstration of
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mineworker resistance was seen until the 1950s. The independent direct
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action by the labor force had a considerable influence on British
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colonial attitudes and policies. Even though the 1935 strikes didn’t win
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mineworkers immediate gains, they set the stage for further struggles in
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the coming decades, including later significant success by the African
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Mineworkers’ Union. |