AnarWiki/markdown/Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion.md

The **Bay of Pigs invasion** was an attempted invasion of Cuba by Cuban
exiles who opposed the new socialist government established after 1959.
Covertly financed and directed by the USA, the operation took place at
the height of the Cold War and its failure led to major shifts in
international relations between Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet
Union.

## Summary

In 1952, American ally General Fulgencio Batista led a coup against
President Carlos Prio, and forced Prio into exile in Miami. Prio's exile
inspired the creation of the 26th July Movement by Castro. The Movement
successfully completed the Cuban Revolution in December 1958. Castro
nationalized American businesses—including banks, oil refineries, and
sugar and coffee plantations—then severed Cuba's formerly-close
relations with the United States and reached out to its Cold War rival,
the Soviet Union. In response, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower
allocated $13.1 million to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in
March 1960, for use against Castro. With the aid of Cuban
counter-revolutionaries, the CIA proceeded to organize an invasion
operation.

After Castro's victory, Cuban exiles who had traveled to the US had
formed the counter-revolutionary military unit Brigade 2506. The Brigade
fronted the armed wing of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF) and
its purpose was to overthrow Castro's increasingly-communist government.
The CIA funded the Brigade, which also included some US
military<sup>\[6\]</sup> personnel, and trained the unit in Guatemala.

Over 1,400 paramilitaries, divided into five infantry battalions and one
paratrooper battalion, assembled and launched from Guatemala and
Nicaragua by boat on 17 April 1961. Two days earlier, eight CIA-supplied
B-26 bombers had attacked Cuban airfields and then returned to the US.
On the night of 17 April, the main invasion force landed on the beach at
Playa Girón in the Bay of Pigs, where it overwhelmed a local
revolutionary militia. Initially, José Ramón Fernández led the Cuban
Army counter-offensive; later, Castro took personal control. As the
invaders lost the strategic initiative, the international community
found out about the invasion, and US President John F. Kennedy decided
to withhold further air support.<sup>\[7\]</sup> The plan devised during
Eisenhower's presidency had required involvement of both air and naval
forces. Without air support, the invasion was being conducted with only
one half of the forces that the CIA had deemed necessary. The invaders
surrendered on April 20. Most of the invading counter-revolutionary
troops were publicly interrogated and put into Cuban prisons. The
invading force had been defeated within three days by the Cuban
Revolutionary Armed Forces.

The invasion was a US foreign policy failure. The invasion's defeat
solidified Castro's role as a national hero, and widened the political
divide between the two formerly-allied countries. It also pushed Cuba
closer to the Soviet Union, and those strengthened Soviet-Cuban
relations would lead to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

## Contents

  - 1 Background
      - 1.1 Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution
      - 1.2 The counter-revolution
      - 1.3 Tensions with the United States
  - 2 Preparation
      - 2.1 Early plans
      - 2.2 Eisenhower's planning
      - 2.3 Kennedy's operational approval
      - 2.4 Training
  - 3 Participants
      - 3.1 US Government personnel
      - 3.2 Cuban government personnel
  - 4 Prior warnings of invasion
  - 5 Prelude to invasion
      - 5.1 Acquisition of aircraft
      - 5.2 Fleet sets sail (14 April)
      - 5.3 Air attacks on airfields (15 April)
      - 5.4 Deception flight (Saturday, 15 April)
      - 5.5 Reactions (15 April)
      - 5.6 Phony war (16 April)
  - 6 Invasion
      - 6.1 Invasion day (17 April)
      - 6.2 Invasion day plus one (D+1) 18 April
      - 6.3 Invasion day plus two (D+2) 19 April
      - 6.4 Invasion day plus three (D+3) 20 April
  - 7 Aftermath
      - 7.1 Casualties
      - 7.2 Prisoners
      - 7.3 Political reaction
  - 8 Later analysis
      - 8.1 Maxwell Taylor survey
      - 8.2 CIA report
      - 8.3 Invasion legacy in Cuba
      - 8.4 Invasion legacy for Cuban exiles
      - 8.5 Spanish term for the event
      - 8.6 American public reaction
  - 9 Vienna summit meeting
  - 10 Notable surviving veterans of the Bay of Pigs Invasion
  - 11 See also
  - 12 Explanatory notes
  - 13 References
      - 13.1 Citations
      - 13.2 Sources
  - 14 External links

## Background

Since the middle of the 18th century, Cuba had been the crown jewel of
the Spanish colonial empire. In the late 19th century, Cuban nationalist
revolutionaries rebelled against Spanish dominance, resulting in three
liberation wars: the Ten Years' War (1868–1878), the Little War
(1879–1880) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895–1898). The United
States government proclaimed war on the Spanish Empire, resulting in the
Spanish–American War (1898). The US subsequently invaded the island and
forced the Spanish army out. Of note, a special operations attempt to
land a group of at least 375 Cuban soldiers on the island succeeded in
the Battle of Tayacoba of the Spanish–American War. On 20 May 1902, a
new independent government proclaimed the foundation of the Republic of
Cuba, with US Military governor Leonard Wood handing over control to
President Tomás Estrada Palma, a Cuban-born US citizen.<sup>\[8\]</sup>
Subsequently, large numbers of US settlers and businessmen arrived in
Cuba, and by 1905, 60% of rural properties were owned by non-Cuban North
Americans.<sup>\[9\]</sup> Between 1906 and 1909, 5,000 US Marines were
stationed across the island, and returned in 1912, 1917 and 1921 to
intervene in internal affairs, sometimes at the behest of the Cuban
government.<sup>\[10\]</sup>

### Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution

Until Castro, the US was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that the
American ambassador was the second most important man, sometimes even
more important than the Cuban president.

In March 1952, a Cuban general and politician, Fulgencio Batista, seized
power on the island, proclaimed himself president and deposed the
discredited president Carlos Prío Socarrás of the Partido Auténtico.
Batista canceled the planned presidential elections, and described his
new system as "disciplined democracy." Although Batista gained some
popular support, many Cubans saw it as the establishment of a one-man
dictatorship.<sup>\[12\]\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]</sup> Many opponents of the
Batista regime took to armed rebellion in an attempt to oust the
government, sparking the Cuban Revolution. One of these groups was the
National Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* –
MNR), a militant organization containing largely middle-class members
that had been founded by the Professor of Philosophy Rafael García
Bárcena.<sup>\[16\]\[17\]\[18\]</sup> Another was the Directorio
Revolucionario Estudantil (DRE), which had been founded by the
Federation of University Students (FEU) President José Antonio
Echevarría (1932–1957).<sup>\[19\]\[20\]\[21\]</sup> However, the best
known of these anti-Batista groups was the "26th of July Movement"
(MR-26-7), founded by a lawyer named Fidel Castro. With Castro as the
MR-26-7's head, the organization was based upon a clandestine cell
system, with each cell containing ten members, none of whom knew the
whereabouts or activities of the other
cells.<sup>\[22\]\[23\]\[24\]</sup>

Between December 1956 and 1959, Castro led a guerrilla army against the
forces of Batista from his base camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains.
Batista's repression of revolutionaries had earned him widespread
unpopularity, and by 1958 his armies were in retreat. On 31 December
1958, Batista resigned and fled into exile, taking with him an amassed
fortune of more than US$300,000,000.<sup>\[25\]\[26\]\[27\]</sup> The
presidency fell to Castro's chosen candidate, the lawyer Manuel Urrutia
Lleó, while members of the MR-26-7 took control of most positions in the
cabinet.<sup>\[28\]\[29\]\[30\]</sup> On 16 February 1959, Castro
himself took on the role of Prime Minister.<sup>\[31\]\[32\]</sup>
Dismissing the need for elections, Castro proclaimed the new
administration an example of direct democracy, in which the Cuban
populace could assemble *en masse* at demonstrations and express their
democratic will to him personally.<sup>\[33\]</sup> Critics instead
condemned the new regime as un-democratic.<sup>\[34\]</sup>

### The counter-revolution

Further information: Escambray rebellion and Golden exile

Che Guevara (left) and Castro, photographed by Alberto Korda in 1961.

Soon after the success of the Cuban Revolution, militant
counter-revolutionary groups developed in an attempt to overthrow the
new regime. Undertaking armed attacks against government forces, some
set up guerrilla bases in Cuba's mountainous regions, leading to the
six-year Escambray Rebellion. These dissidents were funded and armed by
various foreign sources, including the exiled Cuban community, the US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Rafael Trujillo's regime in the
Dominican Republic.<sup>\[35\]\[36\]\[37\]</sup> No quarter was given
during the suppression of the resistance in the Escambray Mountains,
where former rebels from the war against Batista took different
sides.<sup>\[38\]</sup> On 3 April 1961, a bomb attack on militia
barracks in Bayamo killed four militia, and wounded eight more. On 6
April, the Hershey Sugar factory in Matanzas was destroyed by
sabotage.<sup>\[39\]</sup> On 14 April 1961, guerrillas led by Agapito
Rivera fought Cuban government forces near Las Cruces, Montembo, Las
Villas, where several government troops were killed and others
wounded.<sup>\[39\]</sup> Also on 14 April 1961, a Cubana airliner was
hijacked and flown to Jacksonville, Florida; resultant confusion then
helped the staged 'defection' of a B-26 and pilot at Miami on 15
April.<sup>\[40\]\[41\]</sup>

Castro's government began a crackdown on this opposition movement,
arresting hundreds of dissidents.<sup>\[42\]\[43\]\[44\]</sup> Though it
rejected the physical torture Batista's regime had used, Castro's
government-sanctioned psychological torture, subjecting some prisoners
to solitary confinement, rough treatment, hunger, and threatening
behavior.<sup>\[45\]</sup> After conservative editors and journalists
began expressing hostility towards the government following its
left-ward turn, the pro-Castro printers' trade union began to harass and
disrupt editorial staff actions. In January 1960, the government
proclaimed that each newspaper was obliged to publish a "clarification"
by the printers' union at the end of every article that criticized the
government. These "clarifications" signaled the start of press
censorship in Castro's Cuba.<sup>\[42\]\[46\]</sup>

Popular uproar across Cuba demanded that those figures who had been
complicit in the widespread torture and killing of civilians be brought
to justice. Although he remained a moderating force and tried to prevent
the mass reprisal killings of Batistanos advocated by many Cubans,
Castro helped to set up trials of many figures involved in the old
regime across the country, resulting in hundreds of executions. Critics,
in particular from the U.S. press, argued that many of these did not
meet the standards of a fair trial, and condemned Cuba's new government
as being more interested in vengeance than justice. Castro retaliated
strongly against such accusations, proclaiming that "revolutionary
justice is not based on legal precepts, but on moral conviction." In a
show of support for this "revolutionary justice," he organized the first
Havana trial to take place before a mass audience of 17,000 at the
Sports Palace stadium. When a group of aviators accused of bombing a
village was found not guilty, he ordered a retrial, in which they were
instead found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment.<sup>\[47\]\[48\]\[49\]</sup> On 11 March 1961, Jesús
Carreras Zayas \[es\] and American William Alexander Morgan (a former
Castro ally) were executed after a trial.<sup>\[50\]\[51\]</sup>

### Tensions with the United States

Castro's Cuban government ordered the country's oil refineries – then
controlled by US corporations Esso and Standard Oil and Anglo-Dutch
Shell – to process crude oil purchased from the Soviet Union, but under
pressure from the US government, these companies refused. Castro
responded by expropriating the refineries and nationalizing them under
state control. In retaliation, the US canceled its import of Cuban
sugar, provoking Castro to nationalize most US-owned assets, including
banks and sugar mills.<sup>\[52\]\[53\]\[54\]</sup> Relations between
Cuba and the US were further strained following the explosion and
sinking of a French vessel, the *Le Coubre*, in Havana harbor in March
1960. The cause of the explosion was never determined, but Castro
publicly mentioned that the US government were guilty of
sabotage.<sup>\[55\]\[56\]\[57\]</sup> On 13 October 1960, the US
government then prohibited the majority of exports to Cuba – the
exceptions being medicines and certain foodstuffs – marking the start of
an economic embargo. In retaliation, the Cuban National Institute for
Agrarian Reform took control of 383 private-run businesses on 14
October, and on 25 October a further 166 US companies operating in Cuba
had their premises seized and nationalized, including Coca-Cola and
Sears Roebuck.<sup>\[58\]\[59\]</sup> On 16 December, the US then ended
its import quota of Cuban sugar.<sup>\[60\]</sup>

The US government was becoming increasingly critical of Castro's
revolutionary government. At an August 1960 meeting of the Organization
of American States (OAS) held in Costa Rica, the US Secretary of State,
Christian Herter, publicly proclaimed that Castro's administration was
"following faithfully the Bolshevik pattern" by instituting a
single-party political system, taking governmental control of trade
unions, suppressing civil liberties, and removing both the freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. He furthermore asserted that
international communism was using Cuba as an "operational base" for
spreading revolution in the western hemisphere, and called on other OAS
members to condemn the Cuban government for its breach of human
rights.<sup>\[61\]</sup> In turn, Castro lambasted the treatment of
black people and the working classes he had witnessed in New York, which
he ridiculed as that "superfree, superdemocratic, superhumane, and
supercivilized city." Proclaiming that the US poor were living "in the
bowels of the imperialist monster," he attacked the mainstream US media
and accused it of being controlled by big business.<sup>\[62\]</sup>
Superficially the US was trying to improve its relationship with Cuba.
Several negotiations between representatives from Cuba and the US took
place around this time. Repairing international financial relations was
the focal point of these discussions. Political relations were another
hot topic of these conferences. The US stated that they would not
interfere with Cuba's domestic affairs, but that the island should limit
its ties with the Soviet Union.<sup>\[63\]</sup>

In August 1960, the CIA contacted the Cosa Nostra in Chicago with the
intention to draft a simultaneous assassination of Fidel Castro, Raúl
Castro and Che Guevara. In exchange, if the operation were a success and
a pro-US government were restored in Cuba, the CIA agreed that the Mafia
would get their "monopoly on gaming, prostitution and
drugs."<sup>\[64\]\[65\]</sup>

Tensions percolated when the CIA began to act on its desires to snuff
out Castro. The general public became aware of the attempts to
assassinate Castro in 1975 when a report entitled "Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" was released by the Senate Church
Committee set up to investigate CIA abuses.<sup>\[66\]</sup> Efforts to
murder Castro officially commenced in 1960.<sup>\[66\]</sup> Some
methods that the CIA undertook to murder Castro were creative, for
example: "poison pills, an exploding sea shell, and a planned gift of a
diving suit contaminated with toxins."<sup>\[66\]</sup> More traditional
ways of assassinating Castro were also planned, such as elimination via
high-powered rifles with telescopic sights.<sup>\[66\]</sup> In 1963, at
the same time the Kennedy administration initiated secret peace
overtures to Castro, the Cuban revolutionary and undercover CIA agent,
Rolando Cubela, was tasked with killing Castro by the CIA official,
Desmond Fitzgerald, who portrayed himself as a personal representative
of Robert Kennedy.<sup>\[66\]</sup>

## Preparation

### Early plans

The idea of overthrowing Castro's dictatorship first emerged within the
CIA in early 1960. Founded in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA
was "a product of the Cold War", having been designed to counter the
espionage activities of the Soviet Union's own national security agency,
the KGB. As the perceived threat of international communism grew larger,
the CIA expanded its activities to undertake covert economic, political,
and military activities that would advance causes favourable to U.S.
interests, often resulting in brutal dictatorships that favored US
interests.<sup>\[67\]</sup> The CIA's Director at the time, Allen
Dulles, was responsible for overseeing covert operations across the
world, and although widely considered an ineffectual administrator, he
was immensely popular among his employees, whom he had protected from
the accusations of McCarthyism.<sup>\[68\]</sup> Recognizing that Castro
and his government were becoming increasingly hostile and openly opposed
to the United States, Eisenhower directed the CIA to begin preparations
of invading Cuba and overthrowing the Castro regime.<sup>\[69\]</sup>
The man overseeing plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion was Richard M.
Bissell Jr., the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). He assembled a
number of other agents to aid him in the plot, many of whom had worked
on the 1954 Guatemalan coup six years before; these included David
Philips, Gerry Droller and E. Howard Hunt.<sup>\[70\]</sup>

Bissell placed Droller in charge of liaising with anti-Castro segments
of the Cuban-American community living in the United States, and asked
Hunt to fashion a government-in-exile, which the CIA would effectively
control.<sup>\[71\]</sup> Hunt proceeded to travel to Havana, where he
spoke with Cubans from various backgrounds and discovered a brothel
through the Mercedes-Benz agency.<sup>\[72\]</sup> Returning to the US,
he informed the Cuban-Americans with whom he was liaising that they
would have to move their base of operations from Florida to Mexico City,
because the State Department refused to permit the training of a militia
on US soil. Although unhappy with the news, they conceded to the
order.<sup>\[72\]</sup>

President Eisenhower had meetings with President-elect Kennedy at the
White House on 6 December 1960 and 19 January 1961.<sup>\[73\]</sup> In
one conversation, Eisenhower stated that since March 1960, the US
government had trained "in small units—but we had done nothing
else—\[...\] some hundreds of refugees" in Guatemala, "a few in
Panama, and some in Florida."<sup>\[73\]</sup> However, Eisenhower also
expressed disapproval of the idea of Batista returning to power and was
waiting for the exiles to agree on a leader who was opposed to both
Castro and Batista.<sup>\[73\]</sup>

### Eisenhower's planning

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who authorized the Central Intelligence
Agency to plan the Bay of Pigs Invasion

On 17 March 1960, the CIA put forward their plan for the overthrow of
Castro's administration to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC),
where President Eisenhower lent his support.<sup>\[67\]</sup> The first
stated objective of the plan was to "bring about the replacement of the
Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban
people and more acceptable to the US in such a manner to avoid any
appearance of US intervention."<sup>\[74\]</sup> Four major forms of
action were to be taken to aid anti-communist opposition in Cuba at the
time. These included providing a powerful propaganda offensive against
the regime, perfect a covert intelligence network within Cuba,
developing paramilitary forces outside of Cuba, and acquiring the
necessary logistical support for covert military operations on the
island. At this stage, however, it was still not clear that an invasion
would take place.<sup>\[75\]</sup> Contrary to popular belief, however,
documents obtained from the Eisenhower Library revealed that Eisenhower
never ordered, or approved plans, for an amphibious assault on
Cuba.<sup>\[73\]</sup>

On 18 August 1960, Eisenhower approved a budget of $13,000,000 for the
operation. By 31 October 1960, most guerrilla infiltrations and supply
drops directed by the CIA into Cuba had failed, and developments of
further guerrilla strategies were replaced by plans to mount an initial
amphibious assault, with a minimum of 1,500 men. The election of John
Kennedy as US President sped up preparations for the
invasion;<sup>\[73\]</sup> Kennedy reached out to Cuban exiles who
supported Batista and hinted he was willing to bring Batista back to
power in order to overthrow Castro.<sup>\[76\]</sup> On 18 November
1960, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell first briefed President-elect
Kennedy on the outline plans. Having experience in actions such as the
1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Dulles was confident that the CIA was
capable of overthrowing the Cuban government. On 29 November 1960,
President Eisenhower met with the chiefs of the CIA, Defense, State, and
Treasury departments to discuss the new concept. None expressed any
objections, and Eisenhower approved the plans with the intention of
persuading John Kennedy of their merit. On 8 December 1960, Bissell
presented outline plans to the "Special Group" while declining to commit
details to written records. Further development of the plans continued,
and on 4 January 1961 they consisted of an intention to establish a
"lodgement" by 750 men at an undisclosed site in Cuba, supported by
considerable air power.<sup>\[77\]</sup>

Meanwhile, in the 1960 presidential election, both main candidates,
Richard Nixon of the Republican Party and John F. Kennedy of the
Democratic Party, campaigned on the issue of Cuba, with both candidates
taking a hardline stance on Castro.<sup>\[78\]</sup> Nixon – who was
then Vice President – insisted that Kennedy should not be informed of
the military plans, to which Dulles conceded.<sup>\[79\]</sup> To
Nixon's chagrin, the Kennedy campaign released a scathing statement on
the Eisenhower administration's Cuba policy on 20 October 1960 which
said that "we must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic
anti-Castro forces \[...\] who offer eventual hope of overthrowing
Castro", claiming that "Thus far these fighters for freedom have had
virtually no support from our Government."<sup>\[76\]</sup> At the last
election debate the next day, Nixon called Kennedy's proposed course of
action "dangerously irresponsible" and even lectured Kennedy on
international law,<sup>\[80\]</sup> in effect denigrating the policy
Nixon himself favored.<sup>\[81\]</sup>

### Kennedy's operational approval

Menu

0:00

John F. Kennedy answered difficult questions on Cuba on 12 April, only
five days before the invasion

On 28 January 1961, President Kennedy was briefed, together with all the
major departments, on the latest plan (code-named *Operation Pluto*),
which involved 1,000 men landed in a ship-borne invasion at Trinidad,
Cuba, about 270 km (170 mi) south-east of Havana, at the foothills of
the Escambray Mountains in Sancti Spiritus province. Kennedy authorized
the active departments to continue, and to report
progress.<sup>\[82\]</sup> Trinidad had good port facilities, it was
closer to many existing counter-revolutionary activities, and it offered
an escape route into the Escambray Mountains. That scheme was
subsequently rejected by the State Department because the airfield there
was not large enough for B-26 bombers and, since B-26s were to play a
prominent role in the invasion, this would destroy the façade that the
invasion was just an uprising with no American involvement. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk raised some eyebrows by contemplating airdropping a
bulldozer to extend the airfield.<sup>\[83\]</sup> Kennedy rejected
Trinidad, preferring a more low-key locale.<sup>\[84\]</sup> On 4 April
1961, President Kennedy then approved the Bay of Pigs plan (also known
as *Operation Zapata*), because it had a sufficiently long airfield, it
was farther away from large groups of civilians than the Trinidad plan,
and it was less "noisy" militarily, which would make denial of direct US
involvement more plausible.<sup>\[85\]</sup> The invasion landing area
was changed to beaches bordering the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in
Las Villas Province, 150 km southeast of Havana, and east of the Zapata
Peninsula. The landings were to take place at Playa Girón (code-named
*Blue Beach*), Playa Larga (code-named *Red Beach*), and Caleta Buena
Inlet (code-named *Green Beach*).<sup>\[86\]\[87\]\[88\]\[89\]</sup>

Top aides to Kennedy, such as Dean Rusk and both Joint Chiefs of Staff,
later said that they had hesitations about the plans but muted their
thoughts. Some leaders blamed these problems on the "Cold War mindset"
or the determination of the Kennedy brothers to oust Castro and fulfill
campaign promises.<sup>\[86\]</sup> Military advisers were skeptical of
its potential for success as well.<sup>\[73\]</sup> Despite these
hesitations, Kennedy still ordered the attack to take
place.<sup>\[73\]</sup>

In March 1961, the CIA helped Cuban exiles in Miami to create the Cuban
Revolutionary Council (CRC), chaired by José Miró Cardona, former Prime
Minister of Cuba in January 1959. Cardona became the de facto
leader-in-waiting of the intended post-invasion Cuban
government.<sup>\[90\]</sup>

### Training

Douglas A-26 Invader "B-26" bomber aircraft disguised as a Cuban model

In April 1960, the CIA began to recruit anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the
Miami area. Until July 1960, assessment and training was carried out on
Useppa Island and at various other facilities in South Florida, such as
Homestead AFB. Specialist guerrilla training took place at Fort Gulick,
Panama and at Fort Clayton, Panama.<sup>\[40\]\[91\]</sup> The force
that became Brigade 2506 started with 28 men, who initially were told
that their training was being paid for by an anonymous Cuban millionaire
émigré, but the recruits soon guessed who was paying the bills, calling
their supposed anonymous benefactor "Uncle Sam", and the pretense was
dropped.<sup>\[92\]</sup> The overall leader was Dr. Manuel Artime while
the military leader was José "Pepe" Peréz San Román, a former Cuban Army
officer imprisoned under both Batista and Castro.<sup>\[92\]</sup>

Cuban defectors practicing parachute drops

For the increasing ranks of recruits, infantry training was carried out
at a CIA-run base (code-named *JMTrax*) near Retalhuleu in the Sierra
Madre on the Pacific coast of Guatemala.<sup>\[93\]</sup> The exiled
group named themselves Brigade 2506 (*Brigada Asalto
2506*).<sup>\[93\]</sup> In summer 1960, an airfield (code-named
*JMadd*, aka *Rayo Base*) was constructed near Retalhuleu, Guatemala.
Gunnery and flight training of Brigade 2506 aircrews was carried out by
personnel from Alabama ANG (Air National Guard) under General Reid
Doster, using at least six Douglas B-26 Invaders in the markings of
Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca, legitimate delivery of those being delayed by
about six months.<sup>\[94\]</sup> An additional 26 B-26s were obtained
from US military stocks, 'sanitized' at 'Field Three' to obscure their
origins, and about 20 of them were converted for offensive operations by
removal of defensive armament, standardization of the 'eight-gun nose',
addition of underwing drop tanks and rocket
racks.<sup>\[95\]\[96\]</sup> Paratroop training was at a base nicknamed
*Garrapatenango*, near Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Training for boat
handling and amphibious landings took place at Vieques Island, Puerto
Rico. Tank training for the Brigade 2506 M41 Walker Bulldog
tanks,<sup>\[*citation needed*\]</sup> took place at Fort Knox, Kentucky
and Fort Benning, Georgia. Underwater demolition and infiltration
training took place at Belle Chase near New Orleans.<sup>\[89\]</sup> To
create a navy, the CIA purchased five cargo ships from the Cuban-owned,
but Miami-based Garcia Line, thereby giving "plausible deniability" as
the State Department had insisted no US ships could be involved in the
invasion.<sup>\[97\]</sup> The first four of the five ships, namely the
*Atlantico*, the *Caribe*, the *Houston* and *Río Escondido* were to
carry enough supplies and weapons to last thirty days while the *Lake
Charles* had 15 days of supplies and was intended to land the
provisional government of Cuba.<sup>\[97\]</sup> The ships were loaded
with supplies at New Orleans and sailed to Puerto Cabezas,
Nicaragua.<sup>\[97\]</sup> Additionally, the invasion force had two old
Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) ships, the *Blagar* and *Barbara J* from
World War II that were part of the CIA's "ghost ship" fleet and served
as command ships for the invasion.<sup>\[97\]</sup> The crews of the
supply ships were Cuban while the crews of the LCIs were Americans,
borrowed by the CIA from the Military Sea Transportation Service
(MSTS).<sup>\[97\]</sup> One CIA officer wrote that MSTS sailors were
all professional and experienced, but not trained for
combat.<sup>\[97\]</sup>

In November 1960, the Retalhuleu recruits took part in quelling an
officers' rebellion in Guatemala, in addition to the intervention of the
US Navy.<sup>\[98\]</sup>

The CIA transported people, supplies, and arms from Florida to all the
bases at night, using Douglas C-54 transports. On 9 April 1961, Brigade
2506 personnel, ships, and aircraft started transferring from Guatemala
to Puerto Cabezas.<sup>\[51\]</sup> Curtiss C-46s were also used for
transport between Retalhuleu and a CIA base (code-named *JMTide*, aka
*Happy Valley*) at Puerto Cabezas.

Facilities and limited logistical assistance were provided by the
governments of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes in Guatemala, and General
Luis Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, but no military personnel or equipment
of those nations was directly employed in the
conflict.<sup>\[96\]\[99\]</sup> Both governments later received
military training and equipment, including some of the CIA's remaining
B-26s.

In early 1961, Cuba's army possessed Soviet-designed T-34 medium tanks,
IS-2 heavy tanks, SU-100 tank destroyers, 122mm howitzers, other
artillery and small arms plus Italian 105mm howitzers. The Cuban air
force armed inventory included B-26 Invader light bombers, Hawker Sea
Fury fighters and Lockheed T-33 jets, all remaining from the *Fuerza
Aérea del Ejército de Cuba* (FAEC), the Cuban air force of the Batista
government.<sup>\[93\]</sup>

Anticipating an invasion, Che Guevara stressed the importance of an
armed civilian populace, stating: "all of the Cuban people must become a
guerrilla army; each and every Cuban must learn to handle and if
necessary use firearms in defense of the nation".<sup>\[100\]</sup>

## Participants

### US Government personnel

In April 1960, FRD (*Frente Revolucionario Democratico* – Democratic
Revolutionary Front) rebels were taken to Useppa Island, a private
island off the coast of Florida, which was covertly leased by the CIA at
the time. Once the rebels had arrived, they were greeted by instructors
from U.S. Army special forces groups, members from the U.S. Air Force
and Air National Guard and members of the CIA. The rebels were trained
in amphibious assault tactics, guerrilla warfare, infantry and weapons
training, unit tactics and land navigation.<sup>\[101\]</sup>

The recruiting of Cuban exiles in Miami was organized by CIA staff
officers E. Howard Hunt and Gerry Droller. Detailed planning, training
and military operations were conducted by Jacob Esterline, Colonel Jack
Hawkins, Félix Rodríguez and Colonel Stanley W. Beerli under the
direction of Richard Bissell and his deputy Tracy
Barnes.<sup>\[89\]</sup>

### Cuban government personnel

Already, Fidel Castro was known as, and addressed as, the
commander-in-chief of Cuban armed forces, with a nominal base at 'Point
One' in Havana. In early April 1961, his brother Raúl Castro was
assigned command of forces in the east, based in Santiago de Cuba. Che
Guevara commanded western forces, based in Pinar del Río. Major Juan
Almeida Bosque commanded forces in the central provinces, based in Santa
Clara. Raúl Curbelo Morales was head of the Cuban Air Force (Fuerza
Aérea Revolucionaria or FAR). Sergio del Valle Jiménez was Director of
Headquarters Operations at Point One. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the Head
of the Revolutionary National Police. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez was
Minister of the Interior and head of G-2 (Seguridad del Estado, or state
security). His deputy was Comandante Manuel Piñeiro Losada, also known
as 'Barba Roja'. Captain José Ramón Fernández was head of the School of
Militia Leaders (Cadets) at
Matanzas.<sup>\[3\]\[102\]\[103\]\[104\]\[105\]</sup>

Other commanders of units during the conflict included Major Raúl
Menéndez Tomassevich, Major Filiberto Olivera Moya, Major René de los
Santos, Major Augusto Martínez Sanchez, Major Félix Duque, Major Pedro
Miret, Major Flavio Bravo, Major Antonio Lussón, Captain Orlando Pupo
Pena, Captain Victor Dreke, Captain Emilio Aragonés, Captain Angel
Fernández Vila, Arnaldo Ochoa, and Orlando Rodriguez
Puerta.<sup>\[40\]\[106\]</sup>

Soviet-trained Spanish advisors were brought to Cuba from Eastern Bloc
countries. These advisors had held high staff positions in the Soviet
armies during World War II and became known as "Hispano-Soviets," having
long resided in the Soviet Union. The most senior of these was the
Spanish communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Ciutat de
Miguel, Enrique Líster and Cuban-born Alberto Bayo.<sup>\[107\]</sup>
Ciutat de Miguel (Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred
to as "Angelito"), was an advisor to forces in the central provinces.
The role of other Soviet agents at the time is uncertain, but some of
them acquired greater fame later. For example, two KGB colonels, Vadim
Kochergin and Victor Simanov were first sighted in Cuba in about
September 1959.<sup>\[108\]\[109\]</sup>

## Prior warnings of invasion

The Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming, via their
extensive secret intelligence network, as well as the loose talk by
members of the brigade, some of which was heard in Miami, and was
repeated in US and foreign newspaper reports. Nevertheless, days before
the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the El
Encanto fire, an arson attack in a department store in Havana on 13
April that killed one shop worker.<sup>\[40\]\[110\]</sup> The Cuban
government also had been warned by senior KGB agents Osvaldo Sánchez
Cabrera and 'Aragon', who died violently before and after the invasion,
respectively.<sup>\[111\]</sup> The general Cuban population was not
well informed, except for CIA-funded Radio Swan.<sup>\[112\]</sup> As of
May 1960, almost all means of public communication were in the
government's hands.<sup>\[113\]\[114\]</sup>

On 29 April 2000, a *The Washington Post* article, "Soviets Knew Date of
Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the
Soviet Union knew the invasion was going to take place, and did not
inform Kennedy. On 13 April 1961, Radio Moscow broadcast an
English-language newscast, predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by
the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place
four days later.<sup>\[115\]</sup>

David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador to the US, stated that British
intelligence analysis, as made available to the CIA, indicated that the
Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro, and that there was no
likelihood of mass defections or insurrections.<sup>\[116\]</sup>

## Prelude to invasion

### Acquisition of aircraft

From June to September 1960, the most time consuming task was the
acquisition of the aircraft to be used in the invasion. The anti-Castro
effort depended on the success of these aircraft. Although models such
as the C-46 and C-54 were to be used for airdrops and bomb drops as well
as infiltration and exfiltration, they were looking for an aircraft that
could perform tactical strikes. The two models that were going to be
decided on were the Navy's Douglas AD-5 Skyraider or the Air Force's
light bomber, the B-26. The AD-5 was readily available and ready for the
Navy to train pilots, and in a meeting among a special group in the
office of the Deputy Director of the CIA, the AD-5 was approved and
decided on. After a cost benefit analysis, word was sent that the AD-5
plan would be abandoned and the B-26 would take its
place.<sup>\[117\]</sup>

### Fleet sets sail (14 April)

Under cover of darkness, the invasion fleet set sail from Puerto
Cabezas, Nicaragua and headed towards the Bay of Pigs on the night of 14
April.<sup>\[118\]</sup> After on-loading the attack planes in Norfolk
Naval Base and taking on prodigious quantities of food and supplies
sufficient for the seven weeks at-sea to come, the crew knew from the
hasty camouflage of the ship's and aircraft identifying numbers that a
secret mission was on hand. The aircraft carrier group of the
USS *Essex* had been at sea for nearly a month before the invasion; its
crew was well aware of the impending battle. En route, *Essex* had made
a night time stop at a Navy arms depot in Charleston, South Carolina to
load tactical nuclear weapons to be held ready during the cruise. The
afternoon of the invasion, one accompanying destroyer rendezvoused with
*Essex* to have a gun mount repaired and put back into action; the ship
displayed numerous shell casings on deck from its shore bombardment
actions. On 16 April *Essex* was at General quarters for most of a day;
Soviet MiG-15s made feints and close range fly overs that night, with
Soviet Red Stars prominent.<sup>\[119\]</sup>

### Air attacks on airfields (15 April)

During the night of 14/15 April, a diversionary landing was planned near
Baracoa, Oriente Province, by about 164 Cuban exiles commanded by
Higinio 'Nino' Diaz. Their mother ship, named *La Playa* or *Santa Ana*,
had sailed from Key West under a Costa Rican ensign. Several US Navy
destroyers were stationed offshore near Guantánamo Bay to give the
appearance of an impending invasion fleet.<sup>\[120\]</sup> The
reconnaissance boats turned back to the ship after their crews detected
activities by Cuban militia forces along the
coastline.<sup>\[3\]\[93\]\[103\]\[121\]\[122\]\[123\]</sup>

As a result of those activities, at daybreak, a reconnaissance sortie
over the Baracoa area was launched from Santiago de Cuba by an FAR T-33,
piloted by Lt Orestes Acosta and it crashed fatally into the sea. On 17
April, his name was falsely quoted as a defector among the
disinformation circulating in Miami.<sup>\[124\]</sup>

The CIA, with the backing of the Pentagon, had originally requested
permission to produce sonic booms over Havana on 14 April to create an
air of confusion. The request was a form of psychological warfare that
had proven successful in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in
1954. The point was to create confusion in Havana and have it be a
distraction to Castro if they could "break all the windows in
town."<sup>\[125\]</sup> The request was denied, however, since
officials thought such would be too obvious a sign of involvement by the
United States.<sup>\[126\]</sup>

On 15 April 1961, at about 06:00 am Cuban local time, eight B-26B
Invader bombers in three groups simultaneously attacked three Cuban
airfields at San Antonio de los Baños and at Ciudad Libertad (formerly
named Campo Columbia), both near Havana, plus the Antonio Maceo
International Airport at Santiago de Cuba. The B-26s had been prepared
by the CIA on behalf of Brigade 2506, and had been painted with the
false flag markings of the FAR. Each came armed with bombs, rockets, and
machine guns. They had flown from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua and were
crewed by exiled Cuban pilots and navigators of the self-styled *Fuerza
Aérea de Liberación* (FAL). The purpose of the action (code-named
*Operation Puma*) was reportedly to destroy most or all of the armed
aircraft of the FAR in preparation for the main invasion. At Santiago,
the two attackers destroyed a C-47 transport, a PBY Catalina flying
boat, two B-26s and a civilian DC-3 plus various other civilian
aircraft. At San Antonio, the three attackers destroyed three FAR B-26s,
one Sea Fury and one T-33, and one attacker diverted to Grand Cayman due
to low usable fuel. Aircraft that diverted to the Caymans were seized by
Great Britain since they were suspicious that the Cayman Islands might
be perceived as a launch site for the invasion.<sup>\[126\]</sup> At
Ciudad Libertad, the three attackers destroyed only non-operational
aircraft such as two P-47 Thunderbolts. One of those attackers was
damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and ditched about 50 km north of
Cuba,<sup>\[127\]</sup> with the loss of its crew Daniel Fernández Mon
and Gaston Pérez. Its companion B-26, also damaged, continued north and
landed at Boca Chica Field, Florida. The crew, José Crespo and Lorenzo
Pérez-Lorenzo, were granted political asylum, and made their way back
to Nicaragua the next day via Miami and the daily CIA C-54 flight from
Opa-locka Airport to Puerto Cabezas Airport. Their B-26, purposely
numbered 933, the same as at least two other B-26s that day for
disinformation reasons, was held until late on 17
April.<sup>\[124\]\[128\]</sup>

### Deception flight (Saturday, 15 April)

About 90 minutes after the eight B-26s had taken off from Puerto Cabezas
to attack Cuban airfields, another B-26 departed on a deception flight
that took it close to Cuba but headed north towards Florida. Like the
bomber groups, it carried false FAR markings and the same number 933 as
painted on at least two of the others. Before departure, the cowling
from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by CIA personnel,
fired upon, then re-installed to give the false appearance that the
aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. At a
safe distance north of Cuba, the pilot feathered the engine with the
pre-installed bullet holes in the cowling, radioed a mayday call, and
requested immediate permission to land at Miami International airport.
He landed and taxied to the military area of the airport near an Air
Force C-47 and was met by several government cars. The pilot was Mario
Zúñiga, formerly of the FAEC (Cuban Air Force under Batista), and after
landing, he masqueraded as 'Juan Garcia' and publicly claimed that three
colleagues had also defected from the FAR. The next day he was granted
political asylum, and that night he returned to Puerto Cabezas via
Opa-Locka.<sup>\[96\]\[124\]\[129\]</sup> This deception operation was
successful at the time in convincing much of the world media that the
attacks on the FAR bases were the work of an internal anti-Communist
faction, and did not involve outside actors.<sup>\[130\]</sup>

### Reactions (15 April)

At 10:30 am on 15 April at the United Nations, the Cuban Foreign
Minister Raúl Roa accused the US of aggressive air attacks against Cuba,
and that afternoon formally tabled a motion to the Political (First)
Committee of the UN General Assembly. Only days earlier, the CIA had
unsuccessfully attempted to entice Raúl Roa into
defecting.<sup>\[126\]</sup> In response to Roa's accusations before the
UN, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson
stated that US armed forces would not "under any conditions" intervene
in Cuba, and that the US would do everything in its power to ensure that
no US citizens would participate in actions against Cuba. He also stated
that Cuban defectors had carried out the attacks that day, and he
presented a UPI wire photo of Zúñiga's B-26 in Cuban markings at Miami
airport.<sup>\[51\]</sup> Stevenson was later embarrassed to realize
that the CIA had lied to him.<sup>\[88\]</sup>

President Kennedy supported the statement made by Stevenson: "I have
emphasized before that this was a struggle of Cuban patriots against a
Cuban dictator. While we could not be expected to hide our sympathies,
we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would
not intervene in any way".<sup>\[131\]</sup>

On 15 April, the Cuban national police, led by Efigenio Ameijeiras,
started the process of arresting thousands of suspected
anti-revolutionary individuals and detaining them in provisional
locations such as the Karl Marx Theatre, the moat of Fortaleza de la
Cabana and the Principe Castle all in Havana, and the baseball park in
Matanzas.<sup>\[50\]</sup>

### Phony war (16 April)

On the night of 15/16 April, the Nino Diaz group failed in a second
attempted diversionary landing at a different location near
Baracoa.<sup>\[103\]</sup>

On 16 April, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged an armed
uprising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, with only four surviving.
Leonel Martinez and three others took to the
countryside.<sup>\[39\]\[*clarification needed*\]</sup>

Following the air strikes on the Cuban airfields on 15 April 1961, the
FAR prepared for action with its surviving aircraft which numbered at
least four T-33s jet trainers, four Sea Fury fighters and five or six
B-26 medium bombers. All three types were armed with machine guns (a
20mm cannon, in the case of the Sea Furies) for air-to-air combat and
for strafing of ships and ground targets. CIA planners had failed to
discover that the US-supplied T-33 trainer jets had long been armed with
M-3 machine guns. The three types could also carry bombs and rocket pods
for attacks against ships and tanks.<sup>\[132\]</sup>

No additional air strikes against Cuban airfields and aircraft were
specifically planned before 17 April, because B-26 pilots' exaggerated
claims gave the CIA false confidence in the success of 15 April attacks,
until U-2 reconnaissance photos taken on 16 April showed otherwise. Late
on 16 April, President Kennedy ordered cancellation of further airfield
strikes planned for dawn on 17 April, to attempt plausible deniability
of US direct involvement.<sup>\[89\]</sup>

Late on 16 April, the CIA/Brigade 2506 invasion fleet converged on
'Rendezvous Point Zulu', about 65 kilometres (40 mi) south of Cuba,
having sailed from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua where they had been
loaded with troops and other materiel, after loading arms and supplies
at New Orleans. The US Navy operation was code-named *Bumpy Road*,
having been changed from *Crosspatch* on 1 April 1961.<sup>\[89\]</sup>
The fleet, labeled the 'Cuban Expeditionary Force' (CEF), included five
2,400-ton (empty weight) freighter ships chartered by the CIA from the
Garcia Line, and subsequently outfitted with anti-aircraft guns. Four of
the freighters, *Houston* (code name *Aguja*), *Río Escondido* (code
name *Ballena*), *Caribe* (code name *Sardina*), and *Atlántico*
(code-name *Tiburón*), were planned to transport about 1,400 troops in
seven battalions of troops and armaments near to the invasion beaches.
The fifth freighter, *Lake Charles*, was loaded with follow-up supplies
and some Operation 40 infiltration personnel. The freighters sailed
under Liberian ensigns. Accompanying them were two LCIs outfitted with
heavy armament at Key West. The LCIs were *Blagar* (code-name *Marsopa*)
and *Barbara J* (code-name *Barracuda*), sailing under Nicaraguan
ensigns. After exercises and training at Vieques Island, the CEF ships
were individually escorted (outside visual range) to *Point Zulu* by US
Navy destroyers USS *Bache*, USS *Beale*, USS *Conway*, USS *Cony*,
USS *Eaton*, USS *Murray*, and USS *Waller*. US Navy Task Group 81.8
had already assembled off the Cayman Islands, commanded by Rear Admiral
John E. Clark onboard aircraft carrier USS *Essex*, plus helicopter
assault carrier USS *Boxer*, destroyers USS *Hank*, USS *John W. Weeks*,
USS *Purdy*, USS *Wren*, and submarines USS *Cobbler* and
USS *Threadfin*. Command and control ship USS *Northampton* and carrier
USS *Shangri-La* were also reportedly active in the Caribbean at the
time. USS *San Marcos* was a Landing Ship Dock that carried three
Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) which could accommodate the Brigades M41
Walker Bulldog tanks and four Landing Craft, Vehicles, Personnel
(LCVPs). *San Marcos* had sailed from Vieques Island. At *Point Zulu*,
the seven CEF ships sailed north without the USN escorts, except for
*San Marcos* that continued until the seven landing craft were unloaded
when just outside the 5 kilometres (3 mi) Cuban territorial
limit.<sup>\[40\]\[51\]\[133\]</sup>

## Invasion

### Invasion day (17 April)

Bahia de Cochinos 1961

During the night of 16/17 April, a mock diversionary landing was
organized by CIA operatives near Bahía Honda, Pinar del Río Province. A
flotilla containing equipment that broadcast sounds and other effects of
a shipborne invasion landing provided the source of Cuban reports that
briefly lured Fidel Castro away from the Bay of Pigs battlefront
area.<sup>\[40\]\[103\]\[134\]</sup>

At about 00:00 on 17 April 1961, the two LCIs *Blagar* and *Barbara J*,
each with a CIA 'operations officer' and an Underwater Demolition Team
(UDT) of five frogmen, entered the Bay of Pigs *(Bahía de Cochinos)* on
the southern coast of Cuba. They headed a force of four transport ships
(*Houston*, *Río Escondido*, *Caribe* and *Atlántico*) carrying about
1,400 Cuban exile ground troops of Brigade 2506, plus the Brigade's M41
tanks,<sup>\[*citation needed*\]</sup> and other vehicles in the landing
craft.<sup>\[135\]</sup> At about 01:00, *Blagar*, as the battlefield
command ship, directed the principal landing at Playa Girón (code-named
*Blue Beach*), led by the frogmen in rubber boats followed by troops
from *Caribe* in small aluminium boats, then the LCVPs and LCUs with the
M41 tanks.<sup>\[136\]</sup> *Barbara J*, leading *Houston*, similarly
landed troops 35 km further northwest at Playa Larga (code-named *Red
Beach*), using small fiberglass boats.<sup>\[136\]</sup> The unloading
of troops at night was delayed, due to engine failures and boats damaged
by unforeseen coral reefs; the CIA had originally believed that the
coral reef was seaweed. As the frogmen came in, they were shocked to
discover that the Red Beach was lit with floodlights, which led to the
location of the landing being hastily changed.<sup>\[136\]</sup> As the
frogmen landed, a firefight broke out when a jeep carrying Cuban militia
happened by.<sup>\[136\]</sup> The few militias in the area succeeded in
warning Cuban armed forces via radio soon after the first landing,
before the invaders overcame their token
resistance.<sup>\[103\]\[137\]</sup> Castro was woken up at about 3:15
am to be informed of the landings, which led him to put all militia
units in the area on the highest state of alert and to order
airstrikes.<sup>\[136\]</sup> The Cuban regime planned to strike the
*brigadistas* at Playa Larga first as they were inland before turning on
the *brigadistas* at Girón at sea.<sup>\[136\]</sup> *El Comandante*
departed personally to lead his forces into battle against the
*brigadistas*.<sup>\[136\]</sup>

At daybreak around 06:30 am, three FAR Sea Furies, one B-26 bomber and
two T-33s started attacking those CEF ships still unloading troops. At
about 06:50, south of Playa Larga, *Houston* was damaged by several
bombs and rockets from a Sea Fury and a T-33, and about two hours later
Captain Luis Morse intentionally beached it on the western side of the
bay.<sup>\[136\]</sup> About 270 troops had been unloaded, but about 180
survivors who struggled ashore were incapable of taking part in further
action because of the loss of most of their weapons and equipment. The
loss of *Houston* was a great blow to the *brigadistas* as that ship was
carrying much of the Brigade 2506's medical supplies, which meant that
wounded *brigadistas* had to make do with inadequate medical
care.<sup>\[136\]</sup> At about 07:00, two FAL B-26s attacked and sank
the Cuban Navy Patrol Escort ship *El Baire* at Nueva Gerona on the Isle
of Pines.<sup>\[103\]\[124\]</sup> They then proceeded to Girón to join
two other B-26s to attack Cuban ground troops and provide distraction
air cover for the paratroop C-46s and the CEF ships under air attack.
Brigade 2506's M41 tanks had all landed by 7:30 am at Blue Beach and all
of the troops by 8:30 am.<sup>\[138\]</sup> Neither San Román at Blue
Beach nor Erneido Oliva at Red Beach could communicate as all of the
radios had been soaked in the water during the
landings.<sup>\[138\]</sup>

The SU-100 from which Fidel Castro reportedly shelled the freighter
Houston during the morning of 17 April

At about 07:30, five C-46 and one C-54 transport aircraft dropped 177
paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 in an action
code-named *Operation Falcon*.<sup>\[139\]</sup> About 30 men, plus
heavy equipment, were dropped south of the Central Australia sugar mill
on the road to Palpite and Playa Larga, but the equipment was lost in
the swamps, and the troops failed to block the road.<sup>\[138\]</sup>
Other troops were dropped at San Blas, at Jocuma between Covadonga and
San Blas, and at Horquitas between Yaguaramas and San Blas. Those
positions to block the roads were maintained for two days, reinforced by
ground troops from Playa Girón and tanks.<sup>\[140\]</sup> The
paratroopers had landed amid a collection of militia, but their training
allowed them to hold their own against the ill-trained
militiamen.<sup>\[138\]</sup> However, the dispersal of the paratroopers
as they landed meant they were unable to take the road from the Central
Australia sugar mill down to Playa Larga, which allowed the government
to continue to send troops down to resist the
invasion.<sup>\[138\]</sup>

At about 08:30, a FAR Sea Fury piloted by Carlos Ulloa Arauz crashed in
the bay, due to stalling or anti-aircraft fire, after encountering a FAL
C-46 returning south after dropping paratroops. By 09:00, Cuban troops
and militia from outside the area had started arriving at the Central
Australia sugar mill, Covadonga and Yaguaramas. Throughout the day they
were reinforced by more troops, heavy armour and T-34 tanks typically
carried on flat-bed trucks.<sup>\[141\]</sup> At about 09:30, FAR Sea
Furies and T-33s fired rockets at *Rio Escondido*, which then 'blew up'
and sank about 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of
Girón.<sup>\[93\]\[103\]</sup> *Rio Escondido* was loaded with aviation
fuel and as the ship started to burn, the captain gave the order to
abandon ship with the ship being destroyed in three explosions shortly
afterwards.<sup>\[142\]</sup> *Rio Escondido* carried not only fuel, but
also enough ammunition, food and medical supplies to last ten days and
the radio that allowed the Brigade to communicate with the
FAL.<sup>\[142\]</sup> The loss of the communications ship *Rio
Escondido* meant that San Román was only able to issue orders to the
forces at Blue Beach, and he had no idea of what was happening at Red
Beach or with the paratroopers.<sup>\[142\]</sup> A messenger from Red
Beach arrived at about 10:00 am asking San Román to send tank and
infantry to block the road from the Central Australia sugar mill, a
request that he agreed to.<sup>\[142\]</sup> It was not expected that
government forces would be counter-attacking from this
direction.<sup>\[143\]</sup>

At about 11:00, Castro issued a statement over Cuba's nationwide network
saying that the invaders, members of the exiled Cuban revolutionary
front, have come to destroy the revolution and take away the dignity and
rights of men.<sup>\[144\]</sup>

At about 11:00, a FAR T-33 attacked and shot down a FAL B-26 (serial
number 935) piloted by Matias Farias, who then survived a crash landing
on the Girón airfield, his navigator Eduardo González already killed by
gunfire. His companion B-26 suffered damage and diverted to Grand Cayman
Island; pilot Mario Zúñiga (the 'defector') and navigator Oscar Vega
returned to Puerto Cabezas via CIA C-54 on 18 April. By about 11:00, the
two remaining freighters *Caribe* and *Atlántico*, and the LCIs and
LCUs, started retreating south to international waters, but still
pursued by FAR aircraft. At about noon, a FAR B-26 exploded due to heavy
anti-aircraft fire from *Blagar*, and pilot Luis Silva Tablada (on his
second sortie) and his crew of three were lost.<sup>\[96\]\[103\]</sup>

By noon, hundreds of Cuban militia cadets from Matanzas had secured
Palpite and cautiously advanced on foot south towards Playa Larga,
suffering many casualties during attacks by FAL B-26s. By dusk, other
Cuban ground forces gradually advanced southward from Covadonga,
southwest from Yaguaramas toward San Blas, and westward along coastal
tracks from Cienfuegos towards Girón all without heavy weapons or
armour.<sup>\[103\]</sup> At 2:30 pm a group of militiamen from the
339th Battalion set up a position, which came under attack from the
*brigadista* M41 tanks, which inflicted heavy losses on the
defenders.<sup>\[145\]</sup> This action is remembered in Cuba as the
"Slaughter of the Lost Battalion" as most of the militiamen
perished.<sup>\[145\]</sup>

Three FAL B-26s were shot down by FAR T-33s, with the loss of pilots
Raúl Vianello, José Crespo, Osvaldo Piedra and navigators Lorenzo
Pérez-Lorenzo and José Fernández. Vianello's navigator Demetrio Pérez
bailed out and was picked up by USS *Murray*. Pilot Crispín García
Fernández and navigator Juan González Romero, in B-26 serial 940,
diverted to Boca Chica, but late that night they attempted to fly back
to Puerto Cabezas in B-26 serial 933 that Crespo had flown to Boca Chica
on 15 April. In October 1961, the remains of the B-26 and its two crew
were found in the dense jungle in Nicaragua.<sup>\[124\]\[146\]</sup>
One FAL B-26 diverted to Grand Cayman with engine failure. By 16:00,
Castro had arrived at the Central Australia sugar mill, joining José
Ramón Fernández whom he had appointed as battlefield commander before
dawn that day.<sup>\[147\]</sup>

On 17 April 1961, Osvaldo Ramírez (leader of the rural resistance to
Castro) was captured by Castro's forces in Aromas de Velázquez, and
immediately executed.<sup>\[148\]</sup>

At about 21:00 on 17 April 1961, a night air strike by three FAL B-26s
on San Antonio de Los Baños airfield failed, reportedly due to
incompetence and bad weather. Two other B-26s had aborted the mission
after take-off.<sup>\[96\]\[132\]</sup> Other sources allege that heavy
anti-aircraft fire scared the aircrews<sup>\[149\]</sup> As night fell,
*Atlantico* and *Caribe* pulled away from Cuba to be followed by
*Blagar* and *Barbara J*.<sup>\[150\]</sup> The ships were to return to
the Bay of Pigs the following day to unload more ammunition, however the
captains of the *Atlantico* and *Caribe* decided to abandon the invasion
and head out to open sea fearing further air attacks by the
FAR.<sup>\[150\]</sup> Destroyers from the US Navy intercepted
*Atlantico* about 110 miles (180 km) south of Cuba, and persuaded the
captain to return, but *Caribe* was not intercepted until she was 218
miles (351 km) away from Cuba, and she was not to return until it was
too late.<sup>\[150\]</sup>

### Invasion day plus one (D+1) 18 April

During the night of 17–18 April, the force at Red Beach came under
repeated counter-attacks from the Cuban Army and
militia.<sup>\[151\]</sup> As casualties mounted and ammunition was used
up, the *brigadistas* steadily gave way.<sup>\[151\]</sup> Airdrops from
four C-54s and 2 C-46s had only limited success in landing more
ammunition.<sup>\[150\]</sup> Both the *Blagar* and *Barbara J* returned
at midnight to land more ammunition, which proved insufficient for the
*brigadistas*.<sup>\[150\]</sup> Following desperate appeals for help
from Oliva, San Román ordered all of his M41 tanks to assist in the
defense.<sup>\[152\]</sup> During the night fighting, a tank battle
broke out when the *brigadista* M41 tanks clashed with the T-34 tanks of
the Cuban Army. This sharp action forced back the
*brigadistas.*<sup>\[152\]</sup> At 20:00, the Cuban Army opened fire
with its 76.2mm and 122mm artillery guns on the *brigadista* forces at
Playa Larga, which was followed by an attack by T-34 tanks at about
midnight.<sup>\[152\]</sup> The 2,000 artillery rounds fired by the
Cuban Army had mostly missed the *brigadista* defense positions, and the
T-34 tanks rode into an ambush when they came under fire from the
*brigadista* M41 tanks and mortar fire, and a number of T-34 tanks were
destroyed or knocked out.<sup>\[152\]</sup> At 1:00 am, Cuban Army
infantrymen and militiamen started an offensive.<sup>\[152\]</sup>
Despite heavy losses on the part of the Communist forces, the shortage
of ammunition forced the *brigadistas* back and the T-34 tanks continued
to force their way past the wreckage of the battlefield to press on the
assault.<sup>\[152\]</sup> The Communist forces numbered about 2,100
consisting of about 300 FAR soldiers, 1,600 militiamen and 200 policemen
supported by 20 T-34s who were faced by 370
*brigadistas*.<sup>\[152\]</sup> By 5:00 am, Oliva started to order his
men to retreat as he had almost no ammunition or mortar rounds
left.<sup>\[153\]</sup> By about 10:30 am on 18 April, Cuban troops and
militia, supported by the T-34 tanks and 122mm artillery, took Playa
Larga after Brigade forces had fled towards Girón in the early hours.
During the day, Brigade forces retreated to San Blas along the two roads
from Covadonga and Yaguaramas. By then, both Castro and Fernández had
relocated to that battlefront area.<sup>\[154\]</sup>

As the men from Red Beach arrived at Girón, San Román and Oliva met to
discuss the situation.<sup>\[155\]</sup> With ammunition running low,
Oliva suggested that the Brigade 2506 retreat into the Escambray
mountains to wage guerilla warfare, but San Román decided to hold the
beachhead.<sup>\[156\]</sup> At about 11:00 am, the Cuban Army began an
offensive to take San Blas.<sup>\[157\]</sup> San Román ordered all of
the paratroopers back in order to hold San Blas, and they halted the
offensive.<sup>\[157\]</sup> During the afternoon, Castro kept the
*brigadistas* under steady air attack and artillery fire, but did not
order any new major attacks.<sup>\[157\]</sup>

At 14:00, President Kennedy received a telegram from Nikita Khrushchev
in Moscow, stating the Russians would not allow the US to enter Cuba,
and implied swift nuclear retribution to the United States heartland if
their warnings were not heeded.<sup>\[158\]</sup>

At about 17:00 on 18 April, FAL B-26s attacked a Cuban column of 12
private buses leading trucks carrying tanks and other armor, moving
southeast between Playa Larga and Punta Perdiz. The vehicles, loaded
with civilians, militia, police, and soldiers, were attacked with bombs,
napalm, and rockets, suffering heavy casualties. The six B-26s were
piloted by two CIA contract pilots plus four pilots and six navigators
from the FAL.<sup>\[103\]\[124\]</sup> The column later re-formed and
advanced to Punta Perdiz, about 11 km northwest of
Girón.<sup>\[159\]</sup>

### Invasion day plus two (D+2) 19 April

Douglas A-4 Skyhawks from the USS *Essex* flying sorties over combat
areas during the invasion

During the night of 18 April, a FAL C-46 delivered arms and equipment to
the Girón airstrip occupied by Brigade 2506 ground forces and took off
before daybreak on 19 April.<sup>\[160\]</sup> The C-46 also evacuated
Matias Farias, the pilot of B-26 serial '935' (code-named *Chico Two*)
that had been shot down and crash-landed at Girón on 17
April.<sup>\[139\]</sup> The crews of the *Barbara J* and *Blagar* had
done their best to land what ammunition they had left onto the
beachhead, but without air support the captains of both ships reported
that it was too dangerous to be operating off the Cuban coast by
day.<sup>\[161\]</sup>

The final air attack mission (code-named *Mad Dog Flight*) comprised
five B-26s, four of which were manned by American CIA contract aircrews
and volunteer pilots from the Alabama Air Guard. One FAR Sea Fury
(piloted by Douglas Rudd) and two FAR T-33s (piloted by Rafael del Pino
and Alvaro Prendes) shot down two of these B-26s, killing four American
airmen.<sup>\[51\]</sup> Combat air patrols were flown by Douglas A4D-2N
Skyhawk jets of VA-34 squadron operating from USS *Essex*, with
nationality and other markings removed. Sorties were flown to reassure
Brigade soldiers and pilots, and to intimidate Cuban government forces
without directly engaging in acts of war.<sup>\[124\]</sup> At 10 am, a
tank battle had broken out, with the *brigadista* holding their line
until about 2:00 pm, which led Olvia to order a retreat into
Girón.<sup>\[162\]</sup> Following the last air attacks, San Román
ordered his paratroopers and the men of the 3rd Battalion to launch a
surprise attack, which was initially successful, but soon
failed.<sup>\[162\]</sup> With the *brigadistas* in disorganized
retreat, the Cuban Army and militiamen started to advance rapidly,
taking San Blas only to be stopped outside of Girón at about 11
am.<sup>\[162\]</sup> Later that afternoon, San Román heard the rumbling
of the advancing T-34s and reported that with no more mortar rounds and
bazooka rounds, he could not stop the tanks and ordered his men to fall
back to the beach.<sup>\[5\]</sup> Oliva arrived afterward to find that
the *brigadistas* were all heading out to the beach or retreating into
the jungle or swamps.<sup>\[5\]</sup> Without direct air support, and
short of ammunition, Brigade 2506 ground forces retreated to the beaches
in the face of the onslaught from Cuban government artillery, tanks and
infantry.<sup>\[93\]\[163\]\[164\]</sup>

Late on 19 April, destroyers USS *Eaton* (code-named *Santiago*) and USS
*Murray* (code-named *Tampico*) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate
retreating Brigade soldiers from beaches, before fire from Cuban army
tanks caused Commodore Crutchfield to order a
withdrawal.<sup>\[103\]</sup>

### Invasion day plus three (D+3) 20 April

From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties were flown by A4D-2Ns to
obtain visual intelligence over combat areas. Reconnaissance flights are
also reported of AD-5Ws of VFP-62 and/or VAW-12 squadron from USS
*Essex* or another carrier, such as USS *Shangri-La* that was part of
the task force assembled off the Cayman
Islands.<sup>\[103\]\[124\]</sup>

On 21 April, *Eaton* and *Murray*, joined on 22 April by destroyers USS
*Conway* and USS *Cony*, plus submarine USS *Threadfin* and a CIA PBY-5A
Catalina flying boat, continued to search the coastline, reefs, and
islands for scattered Brigade survivors, about 24–30 being
rescued.<sup>\[160\]</sup>

## Aftermath

### Casualties

67 Cuban exiles from Brigade 2506 were killed in action plus ten on the
firing squad, ten on the boat Celia trying to escape, 9 in the sealed
container on the way to Havana, four by accident, 2 in prison, 4
American aviators for a total of 106 casualties.<sup>\[E\]</sup>
Aircrews killed in action totaled six from the Cuban air force, 10 Cuban
exiles and 4 American airmen.<sup>\[96\]</sup> Paratrooper Eugene Herman
Koch<sup>\[165\]</sup> was killed in action, and the American airmen
shot down were Thomas W. Ray, Leo F. Baker, Riley W. Shamburger, and
Wade C. Gray.<sup>\[103\]</sup> In 1979, the body of Thomas 'Pete' Ray
was repatriated from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted he was linked
to the agency, and awarded him the Intelligence Star.<sup>\[166\]</sup>

The final toll in Cuban armed forces during the conflict was 176 killed
in action.<sup>\[B\]</sup> This figure includes only the Cuban Army and
it is estimated that about 2,000 militiamen were killed or wounded
during the fighting.<sup>\[5\]</sup> Other Cuban forces casualties were
between 500 and 4,000 (killed, wounded or missing).<sup>\[C\]</sup> The
airfield attacks on 15 April left 7 Cubans dead and 53
wounded.<sup>\[40\]</sup>

In 2011, the National Security Archive, under the Freedom of Information
Act, released over 1200 pages of documents. One detail within these
documents was incidents of friendly fire. The CIA had outfitted some
B-26 bombers to appear as Cuban aircraft, having ordered them to remain
inland to avoid being fired upon by American-backed forces. Some of the
planes, not heeding the warning, came under fire. According to CIA
operative Grayston Lynch, "we couldn't tell them from the Castro planes.
We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there
because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could
see."<sup>\[126\]</sup>

### Prisoners

Havana gleefully noted the wealth of the captured invaders: 100
plantation owners, 67 landlords of apartment houses, 35 factory owners,
112 businessmen, 179 lived off unearned income, and 194 ex-soldiers of
Batista.

On 19 April 1961, at least seven Cubans plus two CIA-hired US citizens
(Angus K. McNair and Howard F. Anderson) were executed in Pinar del Rio
province, after a two-day trial. On 20 April, Humberto Sorí Marin was
executed at La Cabaña, having been arrested on 18 March following
infiltration into Cuba with 14 tons of explosives. His fellow
conspirators Rogelio González Corzo (alias "Francisco Gutierrez"),
Rafael Diaz Hanscom, Eufemio Fernandez, Arturo Hernandez Tellaheche and
Manuel Lorenzo Puig Miyar were also
executed.<sup>\[39\]\[50\]\[122\]\[168\]\[169\]</sup>

Between April and October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in
response to the invasion. They took place at various prisons, including
the Fortaleza de la Cabaña and Morro Castle.<sup>\[122\]</sup>
Infiltration team leaders Antonio Diaz Pou and Raimundo E. Lopez, as
well as underground students Virgilio Campaneria, Alberto Tapia Ruano,
and more than one hundred other insurgents were
executed.<sup>\[88\]</sup>

About 1,202 members of Brigade 2506 were captured, of whom nine died
from asphyxiation during transfer to Havana in a closed truck. In May
1961, Castro proposed to exchange the surviving Brigade prisoners for
500 large farm tractors, later changed to
US$28,000,000.<sup>\[170\]</sup> On 8 September 1961, 14 Brigade
prisoners were convicted of torture, murder and other major crimes
committed in Cuba before the invasion. Five were executed and nine
others imprisoned for 30 years.<sup>\[3\]</sup> Three confirmed as
executed were Ramon Calvino, Emilio Soler Puig ("El Muerte") and Jorge
King Yun ("El Chino").<sup>\[50\]\[93\]</sup> On 29 March 1962, 1,179
men were put on trial for treason. On 7 April 1962, all were convicted
and sentenced to 30 years in prison. On 14 April 1962, 60 wounded and
sick prisoners were freed and transported to the US.<sup>\[3\]</sup>

On 21 December 1962, Castro and James B. Donovan, a US lawyer aided by
Milan C. Miskovsky, a CIA legal officer,<sup>\[171\]</sup> signed an
agreement to exchange 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and
medicine, sourced from private donations and from companies expecting
tax concessions. On 24 December 1962, some prisoners were flown to
Miami, others following on the ship *African Pilot*, plus about 1,000
family members also allowed to leave Cuba. On 29 December 1962,
President Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline attended a "welcome back"
ceremony for Brigade 2506 veterans at the Orange Bowl in Miami,
Florida.<sup>\[93\]\[172\]</sup>

### Political reaction

Robert F. Kennedy's Statement on Cuba and Neutrality Laws, 20 April 1961

The failed invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and
made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. On 21 April, in a
State Department press conference, Kennedy said: "There's an old saying
that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan... Further
statements, detailed discussions, are not to conceal responsibility
because I'm the responsible officer of the
Government..."<sup>\[173\]</sup>

The initial U.S. response concerning the first air attacks was of a
dismissive quality. Adlai Stevenson denied any involvement in the first
wave of air strikes, stating before the United Nations, "These charges
are totally false and I deny them categorically." Stevenson continued to
promote a story of two Cuban planes that had reportedly defected to the
United States, apparently unaware that they were in fact U.S. planes
piloted by U.S.-backed Cuban pilots to promote a false story of
defection.<sup>\[174\]</sup>

In August 1961, during an economic conference of the OAS in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy via Richard N.
Goodwin, a secretary of the White House. It read: "Thanks for Playa
Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger
than ever".<sup>\[175\]</sup>

Additionally, Guevara answered a set of questions from Leo Huberman of
*Monthly Review* following the invasion. In one reply, Guevara was asked
to explain the growing number of Cuban counter-revolutionaries and
defectors from the regime, to which he replied that the repelled
invasion was the climax of counter-revolution, and that afterward such
actions "fell drastically to zero." Regarding the defections of some
prominent figures within the Cuban government, Guevara remarked that
this was because "the socialist revolution left the opportunists, the
ambitious, and the fearful far behind and now advances toward a new
regime free of this class of vermin."<sup>\[176\]</sup>

As Allen Dulles later stated, CIA planners believed that once the troops
were on the ground, Kennedy would authorize any action required to
prevent failure – as Eisenhower had done in Guatemala in 1954 after that
invasion looked as if it would collapse.<sup>\[177\]</sup> Kennedy was
deeply depressed and angered with the failure. Several years after his
death, *The New York Times* reported that he told an unspecified high
administration official of wanting "to splinter the CIA in a thousand
pieces and scatter it to the winds." However, following a "rigorous
inquiry into the agency's affairs, methods, and problems... \[Kennedy\]
did not 'splinter' it after all and did not recommend Congressional
supervision."<sup>\[178\]</sup> Kennedy commented to his journalist
friend Ben Bradlee, "The first advice I'm going to give my successor is
to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that because they were
military men their opinions on military matters were worth a
damn."<sup>\[179\]</sup>

Aerial view of missile launch site at San Cristobal,
Cuba<sup>\[180\]</sup>

The aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion and events involving Cuba that
followed caused the US to feel threatened by their neighbor. Previous to
the events at Playa Girón the US government imposed embargoes that
limited trade with Cuba. An article appearing in *The New York Times*
dated 6 January 1960 called trade with Cuba "too
risky."<sup>\[181\]</sup> About six months later in July 1960, the US
reduced the import quota of Cuban sugar, leaving the US to increase its
sugar supply using other sources.<sup>\[182\]</sup> Immediately
following the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy Administration
considered complete trade restrictions with Cuba.<sup>\[183\]</sup> Five
months later the president was authorized to do so. After Cuba's
declaration of Marxism, the Kennedy administration imposed a complete
trade embargo against Cuba. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 the
Kennedy Administration imposed strict travel restrictions for U.S.
citizens.<sup>\[184\]</sup>

According to author Jim Rasenberger, the Kennedy administration became
very aggressive in regards to overthrowing Castro following the failure
of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, reportedly doubling its efforts.
Rasenberger elaborated on the fact that almost every decision that was
made by Kennedy following the Bay of Pigs had some correlation with the
destruction of the Castro administration. Shortly after the invasion
ended, Kennedy ordered the Pentagon to design secret operations to
overthrow the Castro regime. Also, President Kennedy persuaded his
brother Robert to set up a covert action against Castro which was known
as "Operation Mongoose." This clandestine operation included sabotage
and assassination plots.

## Later analysis

### Maxwell Taylor survey

On 22 April 1961, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor,
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and CIA
Director Allen Dulles to form the Cuba Study Group, to report on lessons
to learn from the failed operation. General Taylor submitted the Board
of Inquiry's report to President Kennedy on 13 June. It attributed the
defeat to lack of early realization of the impossibility of success by
covert means, to inadequate aircraft, to limitations on armaments,
pilots, and air attacks set to attempt plausible deniability – and,
ultimately, to loss of important ships and lack of
ammunition.<sup>\[185\]</sup>

The Taylor Commission was criticized, and bias implied. Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy the President's brother, was included in the group,
and the commission collectively was seen to be more preoccupied with
deflecting blame from the White House than concerned with realizing the
real depth of mistakes that promoted the failure in Cuba.

Jack Pfeiffer, who worked as a historian for the CIA until the
mid-1980s, simplified his own view of the failed Bay of Pigs effort by
quoting a statement which Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother, had made to a
Mexican journalist in 1975: "Kennedy vacillated," Raúl Castro said. "If
at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the
island in a sea of blood, but he could have destroyed the revolution.
Lucky for us, he vacillated."<sup>\[186\]</sup>

### CIA report

In November 1961, CIA Inspector-General Lyman B Kirkpatrick, authored a
report 'Survey of the Cuban Operation,' that remained classified until
1998. Conclusions were:<sup>\[187\]</sup>

1.  The CIA exceeded its capabilities in developing the project from

guerrilla support to overt armed action without any plausible
deniability.

1.  Failure to realistically assess risks and to adequately communicate

information and decisions internally and with other government
principals.

1.  Insufficient involvement of leaders of the exiles.
2.  Failure to sufficiently organize internal resistance in Cuba.
3.  Failure to competently collect and analyze intelligence about Cuban
    forces.
4.  Poor internal management of communications and staff.
5.  Insufficient employment of high-quality staff.
6.  Insufficient Spanish-speakers, training facilities, and material
    resources.
7.  Lack of stable policies and/or contingency plans.

In spite of vigorous rebuttals by CIA management of the findings, CIA
Director Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell, and Deputy
Director for Plans Richard Bissell were all forced to resign by early
1962.<sup>\[87\]</sup>

In later years, the CIA's behavior in the event became the prime example
cited for the psychology paradigm known as groupthink
syndrome.<sup>\[103\]</sup>

Further study shows that among various components of groupthink analyzed
by Irving Janis, The Bay of Pigs Invasion followed the structural
characteristics that led to an irrational decision making in foreign
policy pushed by deficiency in impartial leadership.<sup>\[188\]</sup>
An account on the process of invasion decision reads,<sup>\[189\]</sup>

Looking at both the *Survey of the Cuban Operation* and *Groupthink:
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* by Irving Janis,
it identifies the lack of communication and the mere assumption of
concurrence to be the main causes behind the CIA and the President's
collective failure to efficiently evaluate the facts before them. A
considerable amount of information presented before President Kennedy
proved to be false in reality, such as the support of the Cuban people
for Fidel Castro, making it difficult to assess the actual situation and
the future of the operation. The absence of the initiative to explore
other options of the debate led the participants to remain optimistic
and rigid in their belief that the mission would succeed, being
unknowingly biased in the group psychology of wishful thinking as well.

In mid-1960, CIA operative E. Howard Hunt had interviewed Cubans in
Havana; in a 1997 interview with CNN, he said, "...all I could find was
a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<sup>\[190\]</sup>

### Invasion legacy in Cuba

A Sea Fury F 50 preserved at the Museo Giron, Cuba in 2006

For many Latin Americans, the Bay of Pigs Invasion served to reinforce
the already widely held belief that the US could not be trusted. The
invasion also illustrated that the US could be defeated, and thus, the
failed invasion encouraged political groups across the Latin American
region to find ways to undermine US influence.<sup>\[191\]</sup>

Historians often attest the Bay of Pigs fiasco made Castro even more
popular, adding nationalistic sentiments in support of his economic
policies. Following the air attacks on Cuban airfields on 15 April, he
declared the revolution "Marxist-Leninist".<sup>\[104\]</sup> After the
invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for
protection, that helped pave the way for the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Castro was then increasingly wary of further US intervention, and more
open to Soviet suggestions of placing nuclear weapons on Cuba to ensure
its security.

In March 2001, shortly before the 40th anniversary of the invasion, a
conference took place in Havana, attended by about 60 American
delegates. The conference was titled Bay of Pigs: 40 Years
After.<sup>\[192\]</sup> The conference was co-sponsored by Universidad
de La Habana (University of Havana), Centro de Estudios Sobre Estados
Unidos, Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Centro de Investigaciones
Históricas de la Seguridad del Estado; Centro de Estudios Sobre
America, and the US-based National Security Archive. It commenced on
Thursday 22 March 2001 at the Hotel Palco, Palacio de las
Convenciones \[es\], La Habana.<sup>\[193\]\[194\]\[195\]</sup> On 24
March, following the formal conference, many of the delegates and
observers travelled by road to Australia sugar mill, Playa Larga, and
Playa Girón, the site of the initial landing in the invasion. A
documentary film was made of that trip, titled *Cuba: The 40 Years War*,
released on DVD in 2002.<sup>\[196\]</sup> A Cuban FAR combatant at the
Bay of Pigs, José Ramón Fernández, attended the conference, as did four
members of Brigade 2506, Roberto Carballo, Mario Cabello, Alfredo Duran,
and Luis Tornes.

There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la
Defensa' (Defense Day), to prepare the population for an invasion.

### Invasion legacy for Cuban exiles

The Bay of Pigs Memorial in Little Havana, Miami

Many who fought for the CIA in the conflict remained loyal after the
event; some Bay of Pigs veterans became officers in the US Army in the
Vietnam War, including 6 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and
29 captains.<sup>\[197\]</sup> By March 2007, about half of the Brigade
had died.<sup>\[198\]</sup>

In April 2010, the Cuban Pilot's Association unveiled a monument at the
Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport in memory of the 16 aviators for the
exile side killed during the battle.<sup>\[199\]</sup> The memorial
consists of an obelisk and a restored B-26 replica aircraft atop a large
Cuban flag.<sup>\[200\]</sup>

### Spanish term for the event

The name for the invasion in Spanish faces political contestations. The
Cuban government generally calls it "Playa Girón," while Cuban Americans
and ordinary Hispanic Americans generally call it "Bahía de
Cochinos".<sup>\[*citation needed*\]</sup>

### American public reaction

President John F. Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy greeting
2506 Brigade members, 1962.

Only 3 percent of Americans supported military action in
1960.<sup>\[201\]</sup> According to Gallup, 72% of people had a
negative view of Fidel Castro in 1960.<sup>\[201\]</sup> After the
conflict, 61% of Americans approved of the action, while 15% disapproved
and 24% were unsure. This poll was taken by Gallup in late April
1966.<sup>\[202\]</sup> A week after the invasion of Cuba, Gallup took
another series of polls to sample three possible ways of opposing
Castro.<sup>\[203\]</sup> The policy that most resembled the Bay of Pigs
(if the US "should aid the anti-Castro forces with money and war
materials") was still favored by a narrow margin, 44% approval to 41%
rejecting this policy.<sup>\[204\]</sup>

Kennedy's general approval rating actually increased in the first survey
after the invasion, rising from 78 percent in mid-April to 83 percent in
late April and early May.<sup>\[205\]</sup> Dr. Gallup's headline for
this poll read, "Public Rallies Behind Kennedy in Aftermath of Cuban
Crisis." In 1963 a public opinion poll showed 60 percent of Americans
believed that Cuba is "a serious threat to world peace," yet, 63 percent
of Americans did not want the US to remove Castro.<sup>\[201\]</sup>

## Vienna summit meeting

See also: Vienna summit

After the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the construction of the
Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, then President Kennedy
believed that another failure on the part of the United States to gain
control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S.
credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy was thus
determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory
in the Vietnam War. He told James Reston of The New York Times
immediately after his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, "Now we have a
problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the
place."<sup>\[206\]\[207\]</sup>