AnarWiki/markdown/Bhopal_Disaster.md

The **Bhopal Disaster** or **Bhopal Gas Tragedy** was an [industrial
disaster](List_of_Disasters "wikilink") in India in 1984, considered the
worst in human history, with at least 3,600 people killed (although some
estimates go up to 16,000 deaths) and 558,125 injuries. It occured at a
pesticide factory owned by the Union Carbide corporation.

## Background

Built in 1969, the factory was designed to produce pesticide. In 1976,
trade unions began complaining about pollution and workers safet

### Earlier leaks

In 1976, two local trade unions complained of pollution within the
plant.<sup>\[6\]\[14\]</sup> In 1981, a worker was accidentally splashed
with phosgene as he was carrying out a maintenance job of the plant's
pipes. In a panic, he removed his gas mask and inhaled a large amount of
toxic phosgene gas, leading to his demise 72 hours
later.<sup>\[6\]\[14\]</sup> Following these events, journalist Rajkumar
Keswani began investigating and published his findings in Bhopal's local
paper *Rapat,* in which he urged "Wake up people of Bhopal, you are on
the edge of a volcano".<sup>\[15\]\[16\]</sup>

In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were
admitted to a hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear
protective equipment. One month later, in February 1982, a MIC leak
affected 18 workers. In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into
contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body.
Later that same year, in October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In
attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical
burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During
1983 and 1984, there were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine,
phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in
combination.<sup>\[6\]\[14\]</sup>

## Leakage and its effects

### Liquid MIC storage

The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000-litre liquid
MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619. In the months leading up to the
December leak, liquid MIC production was in progress and being used to
fill these tanks. UCC safety regulations specified that no one tank
should be filled more than 50% (here, 30 tons) with liquid MIC. Each
tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization
allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of each tank as needed, and also
kept impurities out of the tanks.<sup>\[17\]</sup>

In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to effectively contain
most of its nitrogen gas pressure, which meant that the liquid MIC
contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure,
tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC.<sup>\[17\]\[18\]</sup>
Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal
facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance.
Maintenance included the shutdown of the plant's flare tower so that a
corroded pipe could be repaired.<sup>\[17\]</sup> With the flare tower
still out of service, production of carbaryl was resumed in late
November, using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt
to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42
tons of liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of
it.<sup>\[18\]</sup>

### The release

Tank 610 in 2010. During decontamination of the plant, tank 610 was
removed from its foundation and left aside.

Methylamine (**1**) reacts with phosgene (**2**) producing methyl
isocyanate (**3**) which reacts with 1-naphthol (**4**) to yield
carbaryl (**5**).

By early December 1984, most of the plant's MIC related safety systems
were malfunctioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In
addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as
the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes.<sup>\[6\]</sup> During
the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, water was believed to have
entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 whilst trying to unclog it, which
contained 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late
October.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The introduction of water into the tank
subsequently resulted in a runaway exothermic reaction, which was
accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and various other
factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel
pipelines.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The pressure in tank E610, although initially
nominal at 2 psi at 10:30 p.m., it had reached 10 psi by 11 p.m. Two
different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was
instrumentation malfunction.<sup>\[19\]</sup> By 11:30 p.m., workers in
the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas, and
began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m., and reported to
the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address
the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees
were instructed to continue looking for leaks. The incident was
discussed by MIC area employees during the break.<sup>\[19\]</sup>

In the five minutes after the tea break ended at 12:40 a.m., the
reaction in tank E610 reached a critical state at an alarming speed.
Temperatures in the tank were off the scale, maxed out beyond 25 °C
(77 °F), and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 40 psi
(275.8 kPa). One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610
crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank
continued to increase to 55 psi (379.2 kPa); this despite the fact that
atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had already begun.<sup>\[19\]</sup>
Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least
partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were
malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized or otherwise rendered
inoperable:<sup>\[20\]\[21\]</sup>

  - A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid

MIC, shut down in January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June
1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high
temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long since been
disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F)
and 40 °C (104 °F)<sup>\[22\]</sup>

  - A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a

connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to
neutralise a leak of the size produced by tank E610

  - A vent gas scrubber, which had been deactivated at the time and was
    in 'standby' mode, and similarly had insufficient caustic soda and
    power to safely stop a leak of the magnitude produced

About 30 tonnes of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45
to 60 minutes.<sup>\[3\]</sup> This would increase to 40 tonnes within
two hours.<sup>\[23\]</sup> The gases were blown in a southeasterly
direction over Bhopal.<sup>\[6\]\[24\]</sup>

A UCIL employee triggered the plant's alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the
concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to
tolerate.<sup>\[19\]\[23\]</sup> Activation of the system triggered two
siren alarms: one that sounded inside the UCIL plant itself, and a
second directed to the exterior, which would alert the public and the
city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one
another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning
siren on while turning off the public one, and this is exactly what was
done: the public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly
turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public
around the factory over tiny leaks.<sup>\[23\]\[25\]\[26\]</sup>
Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.

Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town
inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from
the plant) were fleeing a gas leak at approximately 1
a.m.<sup>\[25\]</sup> Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and
2:10 a.m. gave assurances twice that "everything is OK", and on the last
attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir".<sup>\[25\]</sup>
With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal
authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas
leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. Finally, they received
an updated report that it was "MIC" (rather than "methyl isocyanate"),
of which hospital staff had never heard of and had no antidote for, nor
did they receive any immediate information about it.<sup>\[27\]</sup>

The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately
2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant's public siren was sounded
for an extended period of time, after first having been quickly silenced
an hour and a half earlier.<sup>\[28\]</sup> Some minutes after the
public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to
both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had
occurred at all), and that "the leak had been plugged."<sup>\[28\]</sup>
Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made
aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their
doors to investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to
shelter in place, or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas in the
first place.<sup>\[26\]</sup>

### Acute effects

Reversible reaction of glutathione (top) with methyl isocyanate (MIC,
middle) allows the MIC to be transported into the body.

The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and
a feeling of suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract,
blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People
awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran
inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their
height, children and other residents of shorter stature inhaled higher
concentrations, as methyl isocyanate gas is approximately twice as dense
as air and, therefore, in an open environment has a tendency to fall
toward the ground.<sup>\[29\]</sup>

Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of
deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary
oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs
but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty
degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis.<sup>\[30\]</sup>
The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate
by around 200%.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

### Gas cloud composition

Apart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud
most likely also contained chloroform, dichloromethane, hydrogen
chloride, methylamine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine and carbon dioxide,
that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank
when MIC, chloroform and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly
of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in
the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby
communities.<sup>\[29\]</sup> The chemical reactions may have produced a
liquid or solid aerosol.<sup>\[31\]</sup> Laboratory investigations by
CSIR and UCC scientists failed to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen
cyanide.<sup>\[29\]\[32\]</sup>

#### Immediate aftermath

In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including
UCC) by the Indian government, which subsequently failed to make data
public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was
conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation. The UCC chairman and CEO
Warren Anderson, together with a technical team, immediately travelled
to India. Upon arrival Anderson was placed under house arrest and urged
by the Indian government to leave the country within 24 hours. Union
Carbide organized a team of international medical experts, as well as
supplies and equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community,
and the UCC technical team began assessing the cause of the gas leak.

The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely
affected areas, nearly 70 percent were under-qualified doctors. Medical
staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and
hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas
inhalation.<sup>\[6\]:6</sup>

There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo Bartholemew,
on commission with press agency Rapho, took an iconic color photograph
of a burial on 4 December, *Bhopal gas disaster girl.* Another
photographer present, Raghu Rai, took a black and white photo. The
photographers did not ask for the identity of the father or child as she
was buried, and no relative has since confirmed it. As such, the
identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the
suffering of victims of the Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew's went on
to win the 1984 World Press Photo of the Year.<sup>\[33\]</sup>

Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren and bloated
animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at
hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and
other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food,
became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited
causing further supply shortages.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were
emptied of the remaining MIC by reactivating the plant and continuing
the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions such as having
water-carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to
a second mass evacuation from Bhopal. The Government of India passed the
"Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act" that gave the government rights to
represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of lack of
information or misinformation were widespread. An Indian government
spokesman said, "Carbide is more interested in getting information from
us than in helping our relief work".<sup>\[6\]</sup>

Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs
were safe, but warned not to consume fish. The number of children
exposed to the gases was at least 200,000.<sup>\[6\]</sup> Within weeks,
the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and
mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims.

### Subsequent legal action

Victims of Bhopal disaster march in September 2006 demanding the
extradition of American Warren Anderson from the United States.

Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian
governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started
immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the
Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to
act as the legal representative for victims of the
disaster,<sup>\[34\]</sup> leading to the beginning of legal
proceedings. Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States
federal court system. On 17 April 1985, Federal District court judge
John F. Keenan (overseeing one lawsuit) suggested that "'fundamental
human decency' required Union Carbide to provide between $5 million and
$10 million to immediately help the injured" and suggested the money
could be quickly distributed through the International Red
Cross.<sup>\[35\]</sup> UCC, on the notion that doing so did not
constitute an admission of liability and the figure could be credited
toward any future settlement or judgement, offered a $5 million relief
fund two days later.<sup>\[35\]</sup> The Indian government turned down
the offer.<sup>\[29\]</sup>

In March 1986 UCC proposed a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs'
U.S. attorneys, of $350 million that would, according to the company,
"generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500–600 million over 20
years". In May, litigation was transferred from the United States to
Indian courts by a U.S. District Court ruling. Following an appeal of
this decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer, judging,
in January 1987, that UCIL was a "separate entity, owned, managed and
operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India".<sup>\[34\]</sup>

The Government of India refused the offer from Union Carbide and claimed
US$3.3 billion.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The Indian Supreme Court told both sides
to come to an agreement and "start with a clean slate" in November
1988.<sup>\[34\]</sup> Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached
in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages
caused in the Bhopal disaster.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The amount was
immediately paid.

Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the
settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470
million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the
original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase,
out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover
100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall
in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL
"voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to
specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to
this.<sup>\[34\]</sup>

### Post-settlement activity

In 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired
in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10
years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear
at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named
the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to
press for an extradition from the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court
refused to hear an appeal of the decision of the lower federal courts in
October 1993, meaning that victims of the Bhopal disaster could not seek
damages in a U.S. court.<sup>\[34\]</sup>

In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to
release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September
2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all
original compensation claims and revised petitions had been
"cleared".<sup>\[34\]</sup> The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New
York City upheld the dismissal of remaining claims in the case of *Bano
v. Union Carbide Corporation* in 2006. This move blocked plaintiffs'
motions for class certification and claims for property damages and
remediation. In the view of UCC, "the ruling reaffirms UCC's long-held
positions and finally puts to rest—both procedurally and
substantively—the issues raised in the class action complaint first
filed against Union Carbide in 1999 by Haseena Bi and several
organisations representing the residents of Bhopal".<sup>\[34\]</sup>

In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and
many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence: Keshub
Mahindra, former non-executive chairman of Union Carbide India Limited;
V. P. Gokhale, managing director; Kishore Kamdar, vice-president; J.
Mukund, works manager; S. P. Chowdhury, production manager; K. V.
Shetty, plant superintendent; and S. I. Qureshi, production assistant.
They were each sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and fined ₹100,000
(equivalent to ₹180,000 or US$2,500 in 2019). All were released on bail
shortly after the verdict.

US federal class action litigation, *Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren
Anderson*, was filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act
(ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against
humanity."<sup>\[36\]</sup> It sought damages for personal injury,
medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the
drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The
lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and the subsequent appeal was
denied.<sup>\[37\]</sup> Former UCC CEO Anderson, then 92 years old,
died on 29 September 2014.<sup>\[38\]</sup>

## Long-term effects

In 2018, *The Atlantic* called it the "world’s worst industrial
disaster."<sup>\[1\]</sup>

### Long-term health effects

Some data about the health effects are still not available. The Indian
Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was forbidden to publish health
effect data until 1994.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas
affected," affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were
below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official
immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been
officially certified. Ingrid Eckerman estimated 8,000 died within two
weeks.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]</sup>

The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths
related to the gas release.<sup>\[4\]</sup>

Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A
government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries
including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900
severely and permanently disabling injuries.<sup>\[5\]</sup>

A cohort of 80,021 exposed people was registered, along with a control
group, a cohort of 15,931 people from areas not exposed to MIC. Nearly
every year since 1986, they have answered the same questionnaire. It
shows overmortality and overmorbidity in the exposed group. Bias and
confounding factors cannot be excluded from the study. Because of
migration and other factors, 75% of the cohort is lost, as the ones who
moved out are not followed.<sup>\[6\]\[40\]</sup>

A number of clinical studies are performed. The quality varies, but the
different reports support each other.<sup>\[6\]</sup> Studied and
reported long term health effects are:

  - Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities,
    early cataracts
  - Respiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease,
    pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of TB and chronic bronchitis
  - Neurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills,
    numbness etc.
  - Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
  - Children's health: Peri- and neonatal death rates increased. Failure
    to grow, intellectual impairment, etc.

Missing or insufficient fields for research are female reproduction,
chromosomal aberrations, cancer, immune deficiency, neurological
sequelae, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and children born after
the disaster. Late cases that might never be highlighted are respiratory
insufficiency, cardiac insufficiency (cor pulmonale), cancer and
tuberculosis. Bhopal now has high rates of birth defects and records a
miscarriage rate 7x higher than the national average.<sup>\[16\]</sup>

A 2014 report in *Mother Jones* quotes a "spokesperson for the Bhopal
Medical Appeal, which runs free health clinics for survivors" as saying
"An estimated 120,000 to 150,000 survivors still struggle with serious
medical conditions including nerve damage, growth problems,
gynecological disorders, respiratory issues, birth defects, and elevated
rates of cancer and tuberculosis."<sup>\[41\]</sup>

### Health care

The Government of India had focused primarily on increasing the
hospital-based services for gas victims thus hospitals had been built
after the disaster. When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was
directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the
medical care of the survivors. Thus, Bhopal Memorial Hospital and
Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998 and was obliged to give
free care for survivors for eight years. BMHRC was a 350-bedded super
speciality hospital where heart surgery and hemodialysis were done.
There was a dearth of gynaecology, obstetrics and paediatrics. Eight
mini-units (outreach health centres) were started and free health care
for gas victims were to be offered until 2006.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The
management had also faced problems with strikes, and the quality of the
health care being disputed.<sup>\[42\]\[43\]</sup> Sambhavna Trust is a
charitable trust, registered in 1995, that gives modern as well as
ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of
charge.<sup>\[6\]\[44\]</sup>

### Environmental rehabilitation

When the factory was closed in 1986, pipes, drums and tanks were sold.
The MIC and the Sevin plants are still there, as are storages of
different residues. Isolation material is falling down and
spreading.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The area around the plant was used as a
dumping area for hazardous chemicals. In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity
of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned and tests in 1989 performed by
UCC's laboratory revealed that soil and water samples collected from
near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to
fish.<sup>\[45\]</sup> Several other studies had also shown polluted
soil and groundwater in the area. Reported polluting compounds include
1-naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic
organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper,
nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, and the pesticide
HCH.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the
UCIL factory, Government of Madhya Pradesh presented a scheme for
improvement of water supply.<sup>\[46\]</sup> In December 2008, the
Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be
incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat, which was met by protests from
activists all over India.<sup>\[47\]</sup> On 8 June 2012, the Centre
for incineration of toxic Bhopal waste agreed to pay ₹250 million
(US$3.5 million) to dispose of UCIL chemical plants waste in
Germany.<sup>\[48\]</sup> On 9 August 2012, Supreme court directed the
Union and Madhya Pradesh Governments to take immediate steps for
disposal of toxic waste lying around and inside the factory within six
months.<sup>\[49\]</sup>

A U.S. court rejected the lawsuit blaming UCC for causing soil and water
pollution around the site of the plant and ruled that responsibility for
remedial measures or related claims rested with the State Government and
not with UCC.<sup>\[50\]</sup> In 2005, the state government invited
various Indian architects to enter their "concept for development of a
memorial complex for Bhopal gas tragedy victims at the site of Union
Carbide". In 2011, a conference was held on the site, with participants
from European universities which was aimed for the
same.<sup>\[51\]\[52\]</sup>

### Occupational and habitation rehabilitation

33 of the 50 planned work-sheds for gas victims started. All except one
was closed down by 1992. 1986, the MP government invested in the Special
Industrial Area Bhopal. 152 of the planned 200 work sheds were built and
in 2000, 16 were partially functioning. It was estimated that 50,000
persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims had
found regular employment under the government's scheme. The government
also planned 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings in what is
called the "widow's colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the
upper floors and it was not possible to keep cattle which were their
primary occupation. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc. were
missing for at least a decade.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

### Economic rehabilitation

Immediate relieves were decided two days after the tragedy. Relief
measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period
along with ration cards.<sup>\[6\]</sup> Madhya Pradesh government's
finance department allocated ₹874 million (US$12 million) for victim
relief in July 1985.<sup>\[53\]\[54\]</sup> Widow pension of ₹200
(US$2.80)/per month (later ₹750 (US$11)) were provided. The government
also decided to pay ₹1,500 (US$21) to families with monthly income ₹500
(US$7.00) or less. As a result of the interim relief, more children were
able to attend school, more money was spent on treatment and food, and
housing also eventually improved. From 1990 interim relief of ₹200
(US$2.80) was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the
disaster.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury was
for the majority ₹25,000 (US$350). For death claim, the average sum paid
out was ₹62,000 (US$870). Each claimant were to be categorised by a
doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond
reasonable doubt" that death or injury in each case was attributable to
exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically
examined.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief
and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895
people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The
average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.<sup>\[55\]</sup>

In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. Number of awarded
cases were 574,304 and number of rejected cases 455,213. Total
compensation awarded was ₹15,465 million
(US$220 million).<sup>\[46\]</sup> On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet
of the Government of India approved a ₹12,650 million (US$180 million)
aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the
government.<sup>\[56\]</sup>

### Other impacts

In 1985, Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, called for a U.S.
government inquiry into the Bhopal disaster, which resulted in U.S.
legislation regarding the accidental release of toxic chemicals in the
United States.<sup>\[57\]</sup>

## Causes

There are two main lines of argument involving the disaster. The
"Corporate Negligence" point of view argues that the disaster was caused
by a potent combination of under-maintained and decaying facilities, a
weak attitude towards safety, and an undertrained workforce, culminating
in worker actions that inadvertently enabled water to penetrate the MIC
tanks in the absence of properly working
safeguards.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]</sup>

The "Worker Sabotage" point of view argues that it was not physically
possible for the water to enter the tank without concerted human effort,
and that extensive testimony and engineering analysis leads to a
conclusion that water entered the tank when a rogue individual employee
hooked a water hose directly to an empty valve on the side of the tank.
This point of view further argues that the Indian government took
extensive actions to hide this possibility in order to attach blame to
UCC.<sup>\[58\]</sup>

Theories differ as to how the water entered the tank. At the time,
workers were cleaning out a clogged pipe with water about 400 feet from
the tank. They claimed that they were not told to isolate the tank with
a pipe slip-blind plate. The operators assumed that owing to bad
maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak
into the tank.<sup>\[6\]\[59\]</sup>

This water entry route could not be reproduced despite strenuous efforts
by motivated parties.<sup>\[60\]</sup> UCC claims that a "disgruntled
worker" deliberately connecting a hose to a pressure gauge connection
was the real cause.<sup>\[6\]\[58\]</sup>

Early the next morning, a UCIL manager asked the instrument engineer to
replace the gauge. UCIL's investigation team found no evidence of the
necessary connection; the investigation was totally controlled by the
government, denying UCC investigators access to the tank or interviews
with the operators.<sup>\[58\]\[61\]</sup>

### Corporate negligence

This point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local
government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous
working environment to develop. Factors cited include the filling of the
MIC tanks beyond recommended levels, poor maintenance after the plant
ceased MIC production at the end of 1984, allowing several safety
systems to be inoperable due to poor maintenance, and switching off
safety systems to save money— including the MIC tank refrigeration
system which could have mitigated the disaster severity, and
non-existent catastrophe management plans.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]</sup> Other
factors identified by government inquiries included undersized safety
devices and the dependence on manual operations.<sup>\[6\]</sup>
Specific plant management deficiencies that were identified include the
lack of skilled operators, reduction of safety management, insufficient
maintenance, and inadequate emergency action
plans.<sup>\[6\]\[14\]</sup>

#### Underinvestment

Underinvestment is cited as contributing to an environment. In attempts
to reduce expenses, $1.25 million of cuts were placed upon the plant
which affected the factory's employees and their
conditions.<sup>\[16\]</sup> Kurzman argues that "cuts ... meant less
stringent quality control and thus looser safety rules. A pipe leaked?
Don't replace it, employees said they were told ... MIC workers needed
more training? They could do with less. Promotions were halted,
seriously affecting employee morale and driving some of the most
skilled ... elsewhere".<sup>\[62\]</sup> Workers were forced to use
English manuals, even though only a few had a grasp of the
language.<sup>\[59\]\[63\]</sup>

Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of safety
practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to plant
operations. By 1984, only six of the original twelve operators were
still working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel had also
been halved. No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and
instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the previous
and required one-hour readings.<sup>\[59\]\[62\]</sup> Workers made
complaints about the cuts through their union but were ignored. One
employee was fired after going on a 15-day hunger strike. 70% of the
plant's employees were fined before the disaster for refusing to deviate
from the proper safety regulations under pressure from the
management.<sup>\[59\]\[62\]</sup>

In addition, some observers, such as those writing in the Trade
Environmental Database (TED) Case Studies as part of the Mandala Project
from American University, have pointed to "serious communication
problems and management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian
operation", characterised by "the parent companies \[*sic*\] hands-off
approach to its overseas operation" and "cross-cultural
barriers".<sup>\[64\]</sup>

#### Adequacy of equipment and regulations

The factory was not well equipped to handle the gas created by the
sudden addition of water to the MIC tank. The MIC tank alarms had not
been working for four years and there was only one manual back-up
system, compared to a four-stage system used in the United
States.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]\[65\]</sup> The flare tower and several
vent gas scrubbers had been out of service for five months before the
disaster. Only one gas scrubber was operating: it could not treat such a
large amount of MIC with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which would
have brought the concentration down to a safe level.<sup>\[65\]</sup>
The flare tower could only handle a quarter of the gas that leaked in
1984, and moreover it was out of order at the time of the
incident.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]\[66\]</sup> To reduce energy costs, the
refrigeration system was idle. The MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius,
not the 4.5 degrees advised by the
manual.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]\[65\]</sup> Even the steam boiler,
intended to clean the pipes, was non-operational for unknown
reasons.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]\[65\]</sup> Slip-blind plates that would
have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC
tanks, had the valves been faulty, were not installed and their
installation had been omitted from the cleaning
checklist.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]</sup> As MIC is water-soluble, deluge
guns were in place to contain escaping gases from the stack. The water
pressure was too weak for the guns to spray high enough to reach the gas
which would have reduced the concentration of escaping gas
significantly.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]\[65\]</sup> In addition to it,
carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they were
known to corrode when exposed to acid.<sup>\[12\]</sup>

According to the operators, the MIC tank pressure gauge had been
malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks were used, rather than
repairing the gauge. The build-up in temperature and pressure is
believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas
release.<sup>\[6\]\[39\]\[59\]\[65\]</sup> UCC admitted in their own
investigation report that most of the safety systems were not
functioning on the night of 3 December 1984.<sup>\[67\]</sup> The design
of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was "Indianized" by
UCIL engineers to maximise the use of indigenous materials and products.
Mumbai-based Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants Pvt. Ltd., were the main
consultants, Larsen & Toubro fabricated the MIC storage tanks, and
Taylor of India Ltd. provided the instrumentation.<sup>\[29\]</sup> In
1998, during civil action suits in India, it emerged that the plant was
not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope
with incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local
authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and
manufactured at Bhopal.<sup>\[6\]\[12\]\[39\]\[59\]</sup>

#### Safety audits

Safety audits were done every year in the US and European UCC plants,
but only every two years in other parts of the
world.<sup>\[6\]\[68\]</sup> Before a "Business Confidential" safety
audit by UCC in May 1982, the senior officials of the corporation were
well aware of "a total of 61 hazards, 30 of them major and 11 minor in
the dangerous phosgene/methyl isocyanate units" in
Bhopal.<sup>\[6\]\[69\]</sup> In the audit 1982, it was indicated that
worker performance was below standards.<sup>\[6\]\[61\]</sup> Ten major
concerns were listed.<sup>\[6\]</sup> UCIL prepared an action plan, but
UCC never sent a follow-up team to Bhopal. Many of the items in the 1982
report were temporarily fixed, but by 1984, conditions had again
deteriorated.<sup>\[61\]</sup> In September 1984, an internal UCC report
on the West Virginia plant in the USA revealed a number of defects and
malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC
unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or
effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This
report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design
was the same.<sup>\[70\]</sup>

#### Impossibility of the "negligence"

According to the "Corporate Negligence" argument, workers had been
cleaning out pipes with water nearby. This water was diverted due to a
combination of improper maintenance, leaking and clogging, and
eventually ended up in the MIC storage tank. Indian scientists also
suggested that additional water might have been introduced as a
"back-flow" from a defectively designed vent-gas scrubber. None of these
theoretical routes of entry were ever successfully demonstrated during
tests by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and UCIL
engineers.<sup>\[59\]\[61\]\[68\]\[71\]</sup>

A Union Carbide commissioned analysis conducted by Arthur D. Little
claims that the Negligence argument was impossible for several tangible
reasons:<sup>\[58\]</sup>

1.  The pipes being used by the nearby workers were only 1/2 inch in

diameter and were physically incapable of producing enough hydraulic
pressure to raise water the more than 10 feet that would have been
necessary to enable the water to "backflow" into the MIC tank.

1.  A key intermediate valve would have had to be open for the

Negligence argument to apply. This valve was "tagged" closed, meaning
that it had been inspected and found to be closed. While it is possible
for open valves to clog over time, the only way a closed valve allows
penetration is if there is leakage, and 1985 tests carried out by the
government of India found this valve to be non-leaking.

1.  In order for water to have reached the MIC tank from the

pipe-cleaning area, it would have had to flow through a significant
network of pipes ranging from 6 to 8 inches in diameter, before rising
ten feet and flowing into the MIC tank. Had this occurred, most of the
water that was in those pipes at the time the tank had its critical
reaction would have remained in those pipes, as there was no drain for
them. Investigation by the Indian government in 1985 revealed that the
pipes were bone dry.

### Employee sabotage

Now owned by Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide maintains a website
dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the result of
sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and
operative to prevent the intrusion of water.<sup>\[72\]</sup>

The Union Carbide-commissioned Arthur D. Little report concluded that it
was likely that a single employee secretly and deliberately introduced a
large amount of water into the MIC tank by removing a meter and
connecting a water hose directly to the tank through the metering
port.<sup>\[58\]</sup>

UCC claims the plant staff falsified numerous records to distance
themselves from the incident and absolve themselves of blame, and that
the Indian government impeded its investigation and declined to
prosecute the employee responsible, presumably because it would weaken
its allegations of negligence by Union Carbide.<sup>\[73\]</sup>

The evidence in favor of this point of view includes:

1.  A key witness (the "tea boy") testified that when he entered the

control room at 12:15 am, prior to the disaster, the "atmosphere was
tense and quiet".

1.  Another key witness (the "instrument supervisor") testified that

when he arrived at the scene immediately following the incident, he
noticed that the local pressure indicator on the critical Tank 610 was
missing, and that he had found a hose lying next to the empty manhead
created by the missing pressure indicator, and that the hose had had
water running out of it. (This testimony was corroborated by other
witnesses.)

1.  Graphological analysis revealed major attempts to alter logfiles and
    destroy log evidence.
2.  Other logfiles show that the control team had attempted to purge 1

ton of material out of Tank 610 immediately prior to the disaster. An
attempt was then made to cover up this transfer via log alteration.
Water is heavier than MIC, and the transfer line is attached to the
bottom of the tank. The Arthur D. Little report concludes from this that
the transfer was an effort to transfer water out of Tank 610 that had
been discovered there.

1.  A third key witness (the "off-duty employee of another unit") stated

that "he had been told by a close friend of one of the MIC operators
that water had entered through a tube that had been connected to the
tank." This had been discovered by the other MIC operators (so the story
was recounted) who then tried to open and close valves to prevent the
release.

1.  A fourth key witness (the "operator from a different unit") stated

that after the release, two MIC operators had told him that water had
entered the tank through a pressure gauge. The Little report argues that
this evidence demonstrates that the following chronology took place:

  - At 10:20pm, the tank was at normal pressure, indicating the absence
    of water.
  - At 10:45pm, a shift change took place, after which the MIC storage

area "would be completely deserted". During this period, a "disgruntled
operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the readily
available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, with the intention of
contaminating and spoiling the tank's contents."

  - Water began to flow, beginning the chemical reaction that caused the
    disaster.
  - After midnight, control room operators noticed the pressure rising

and realized there was a problem with Tank 610. They discovered the
water connection, and decided to transfer one ton of the contents out to
try and remove the water. The MIC release then occurred.

  - The cover-up activities discovered during the investigation then
    took place.
  - After over 30 years, in November 2017, S. P. Choudhary, former MIC

production manager, claimed in court that the disaster was not an
accident but the result of a sabotage that claimed thousands of lives.
Chaudry's counsel, Anirban Roy, argued that the theory of design defects
was floated by the central government in its endeavour to protect the
victims of the tragedy. Everyone else who was part of investigations
into the case "just toed the line of the central government.... The
government and the CBI suppressed the actual truth and saved the real
perpetrators of the crime."<sup>\[74\]\[75\]</sup>

Roy argued to the district court that disgruntled plant operator M. L.
Verma was behind the sabotage because he was unhappy with senior
management. The counsel argued that there were discrepancies in the
statements given by persons who were operating the plant at that time
but the central agency chose not to investigate the case properly
because it always wanted to prove that it was a mishap, and not
sabotage. He alleged that Verma was unhappy with Chaudhary and
Mukund.<sup>\[76\]</sup>

## Additional Union Carbide actions

The corporation denied the claim that the valves on the tank were
malfunctioning, and claimed that the documented evidence gathered after
the incident showed that the valve close to the plant's water-washing
operation was closed and was leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety
systems had prevented water from entering the tank by accident. Carbide
states that the safety concerns identified in 1982 were all allayed
before 1984 and had nothing to do with the incident.<sup>\[77\]</sup>

The company admitted that the safety systems in place would not have
been able to prevent a chemical reaction of that magnitude from causing
a leak. According to Carbide, "in designing the plant's safety systems,
a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in" because "the
tank's gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a
large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the
system" and "process safety systems—in place and operational—would have
prevented water from entering the tank by accident". Instead, they claim
that "employee sabotage—not faulty design or operation—was the cause of
the tragedy".<sup>\[77\]</sup>

**Tactical response**

The company stresses the immediate action taken after the disaster and
its continued commitment to helping the victims. On 4 December, the day
following the leak, Union Carbide sent material aid and several
international medical experts to assist the medical facilities in
Bhopal.<sup>\[77\]</sup>

**Financial response**

The primary financial restitution paid by UCC was negotiated in 1989,
when the Indian Supreme Court approved a settlement of US$470 million
(₹1,055 crore; equivalent to $845 million in 2018).<sup>\[78\]</sup>
This amount was immediately paid by UCC to the Indian government. The
company states that the restitution paid "was $120 million more than
plaintiffs' lawyers had told U.S. courts was fair" and that the Indian
Supreme Court stated in its opinion that "compensation levels under the
settlement were far greater than would normally be payable under Indian
law."<sup>\[79\]</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Union Carbide states on its
website that it put $2 million into the Indian prime minister's
immediate disaster relief fund on 11 December 1984.<sup>\[77\]</sup> The
corporation established the Employees' Bhopal Relief Fund in February
1985, which raised more than $5 million for immediate
relief.<sup>\[34\]</sup> According to Union Carbide, in August 1987,
they made an additional $4.6 million in humanitarian interim relief
available.<sup>\[34\]</sup>

Union Carbide stated that it also undertook several steps to provide
continuing aid to the victims of the Bhopal disaster. The sale of its
50.9 percent interest in UCIL in April 1992 and establishment of a
charitable trust to contribute to the building of a local hospital. The
sale was finalised in November 1994. The hospital was begun in October
1995 and was opened in 2001. The company provided a fund with around $90
million from sale of its UCIL stock. In 1991, the trust had amounted
approximately $100 million. The hospital catered for the treatment of
heart, lung and eye problems.<sup>\[72\]</sup> UCC also provided a $2.2
million grant to Arizona State University to establish a
vocational-technical center in Bhopal, which was opened, but was later
closed by the state government.<sup>\[79\]</sup> They also donated $5
million to the Indian Red Cross after the disaster.<sup>\[79\]</sup>
They also developed a Responsible Care system with other members of the
chemical industry as a response to the Bhopal crisis, which was designed
to help prevent such an event in the future.<sup>\[34\]</sup>

### Charges against UCC and UCIL employees

UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail
by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was
taken to UCC's house after which he was released six hours later on
$2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. These actions were
allegedly taken under the direction of then chief secretary of the
state, who was possibly instructed from chief minister's office, who
himself flew out of Bhopal immediately.<sup>\[80\]\[81\]\[82\]</sup>
Later in 1987, the Indian government summoned Anderson, eight other
executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges to appear in
Indian court.<sup>\[83\]</sup> In response, Union Carbide said the
company is not under Indian jurisdiction.<sup>\[83\]</sup>

From 2014, Dow is a named respondent in a number of ongoing cases
arising from Union Carbide's business in Bhopal.<sup>\[84\]</sup>

## Ongoing contamination

Deteriorating section of the MIC plant, decades after the gas leak.

Chemicals abandoned at the plant continue to leak and pollute the
groundwater.<sup>\[55\]\[85\]\[86\]\[87\]</sup> Whether the chemicals
pose a health hazard is disputed.<sup>\[88\]</sup> Contamination at the
site and surrounding area was not caused by the gas leakage. The area
around the plant was used as a dumping ground for hazardous chemicals
and by 1982 water wells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be
abandoned.<sup>\[6\]</sup> UCC states that "after the incident, UCIL
began clean-up work at the site under the direction of Indian central
and state government authorities", which was continued after 1994 by the
successor to UCIL. The successor, Eveready Industries India, Limited
(EIIL), ended cleanup on the site in 1998, when it terminated its
99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state
government of Madhya Pradesh.<sup>\[34\]\[72\]</sup>

UCC's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples
collected from near the factory were toxic to fish. Twenty-one areas
inside the plant were reported to be highly polluted. In 1991 the
municipal authorities declared that water from over 100 wells was
hazardous for health if used for drinking.<sup>\[6\]</sup> In 1994 it
was reported that 21% of the factory premises were seriously
contaminated with chemicals.<sup>\[45\]\[89\]\[90\]</sup> Beginning in
1999, studies made by Greenpeace and others from soil, groundwater, well
water and vegetables from the residential areas around UCIL and from the
UCIL factory area show contamination with a range of toxic heavy metals
and chemical compounds. Substances found, according to the reports, are
naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residues, alpha naphthol, mercury,
organochlorines, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachlorethane,
hexachlorobutadiene, pesticide HCH (BHC), volatile organic compounds and
halo-organics.<sup>\[89\]\[90\]\[91\]\[92\]</sup> Many of these
contaminants were also found in breast milk of women living near the
area.<sup>\[93\]</sup> Soil tests were conducted by Greenpeace in 1999.
One sample (IT9012) from "sediment collected from drain under former
Sevin plant" showed mercury levels to be at "20,000 and 6 million times"
higher than expected levels. Organochlorine compounds at elevated levels
were also present in groundwater collected from (sample IT9040) a 4.4
meter depth "bore-hole within the former UCIL site". This sample was
obtained from a source posted with a warning sign which read "Water
unfit for consumption".<sup>\[94\]</sup> Chemicals that have been linked
to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as
trichloroethylene, known to impair fetal development, at 50 times above
safety limits specified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).<sup>\[93\]</sup> In 2002, an inquiry by Fact-Finding Mission on
Bhopal found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5
trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing women's
breast milk.

A 2004 BBC Radio 5 broadcast reported the site is contaminated with
toxic chemicals including benzene hexachloride and mercury, held in open
containers or loose on the ground.<sup>\[95\]</sup> A drinking water
sample from a well near the site had levels of contamination 500 times
higher than the maximum limits recommended by the World Health
Organization.<sup>\[96\]</sup> In 2009, the Centre for Science and
Environment, a Delhi-based pollution monitoring lab, released test
results showing pesticide groundwater contamination up to three
kilometres from the factory.<sup>\[97\]</sup> Also in 2009, the BBC took
a water sample from a frequently used hand pump, located just north of
the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain 1,000 times
the World Health Organization's recommended maximum amount of carbon
tetrachloride, a carcinogenic toxin.<sup>\[98\]</sup>

In 2010, a British photojournalist who ventured into the abandoned Union
Carbide factory to investigate allegations of abandoned, leaking toxins,
was hospitalized in Bhopal for a week after he was exposed to the
chemicals. Doctors at the Sambhavna Clinic treated him with oxygen,
painkillers and anti-inflammatories following a severe respiratory
reaction to toxic dust inside the factory.<sup>\[99\]\[100\]</sup>

In October 2011, the Institute of Environmental Management and
Assessment published an article and video by two British environmental
scientists, showing the current state of the plant, landfill and solar
evaporation ponds and calling for renewed international efforts to
provide the necessary skills to clean up the site and contaminated
groundwater.<sup>\[101\]</sup>

## Popular culture

### Novels

Amulya Malladi's 2002 novel *A Breath of Fresh Air* relates the story of
a mother and son who develop health issues as a result of exposure to
gas at Bhopal. The book is based on Malladi's recollections of Bhopal
during the incident.<sup>\[102\]</sup>

Indra Sinha released *Animal's People* in 2007. The novel tells the
story of a boy who is born with a spinal condition due to effects of the
gas. The book was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize.

Arundhati Roy's 2017 novel *The Ministry of Utmost Happiness* which
deals with many contemporary political issues in India, also features
several characters still dealing with the aftermath of the gas
leak.<sup>\[103\]</sup>

Annie Murray's novel *Mother and Child* (2019) is partly set in
post-disaster Bhopal.<sup>\[104\]</sup>

### Music

  - B. Dolan - *RSVP* (aka "Lucifer")
  - Renaud - *Morts les enfants*
  - Revolting Cocks - *Union Carbide*

### Film

In 1999, a Hindi film dealing with the tragedy, *Bhopal Express*, was
released. The film stars Kay Kay Menon and Naseeruddin Shah.

In 2014, to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the disaster,
historical-drama *Bhopal: A Prayer for Rain* was released, starring
Martin Sheen as Union Carbide CEO Warren Anderson, Kal Penn, and Mischa
Barton.<sup>\[105\]</sup>

## Activism

Since 1984, individual activists have played a role in the aftermath of
the tragedy. The best-known is Satinath Sarangi (Sathyu), a metallurgic
engineer who arrived at Bhopal the day after the leakage. He founded
several activist groups, as well as Sambhavna Trust, the clinic for gas
affected patients, where he is the manager.<sup>\[6\]</sup> Other
activists include Rashida Bee and Champa Devi Shukla, who received the
Goldman Prize in 2004, Abdul Jabbar and Rachna
Dhingra.<sup>\[106\]\[107\]</sup>

### Local activism

Protest in Bhopal in 2010

Soon after the accident, representatives from different activist groups
arrived. The activists worked on organising the gas victims, which led
to violent repression from the police and the
government.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

Numerous actions have been performed: demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger
strikes, marches combined with pamphlets, books, and articles. Every
anniversary, actions are performed. Often these include marches around
Old Bhopal, ending with burning an effigy of Warren Anderson.

### International activism

Cooperation with international NGOs including Pesticide Action Network
UK and Greenpeace started soon after the tragedy. One of the earliest
reports is the Trade Union report from ILO 1985.<sup>\[61\]</sup>

In 1992, a session of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal on Industrial
Hazards and Human Rights took place in Bhopal, and in 1996, the "Charter
on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights" was adopted.

In 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) met in
Bhopal. Their work contributed to long term health effects being
officially recognised.

Important international actions have been the tour to Europe and United
States in 2003,<sup>\[108\]</sup> the marches to Delhi in 2006 and 2008,
all including hunger strikes, and the Bhopal Europe Bus Tour in 2009.

### Activist organisations

Bhopal People's Health and Documentation Clinic

At least 14 different NGOs were immediately engaged.<sup>\[6\]</sup> The
first disaster reports were published by activist organisations, Eklavya
and the Delhi Science Forum.

Around ten local organisations, engaged on long term, have been
identified. Two of the most active organisations are the women's
organisations—Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila-Stationery Karmachari Sangh and
Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangthan.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

More than 15 national organisations have been engaged along with a
number of international organisations.<sup>\[6\]</sup>

Some of the organisations are:

  - International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal (ICJB), coordinates
    international activities.
  - Bhopal Medical Appeal, collects funds for the Sambhavna Trust.
  - Sambhavna Trust

or Bhopal People's Health and Documentation Clinic. Provides medical
care for gas affected patients and those living in water-contaminated
area.

  - Chingari Trust, provides medical care for children being born in
    Bhopal with malformations and brain damages.
  - Students for Bhopal, based in USA.
  - International Medical Commission on Bhopal, provided medical
    information 1994–2000.

### Settlement fund hoax

On 3 December 2004, the twentieth anniversary of the disaster, a man
falsely claiming to be a Dow representative named Jude Finisterra was
interviewed on BBC World News. He claimed that the company had agreed to
clean up the site and compensate those harmed in the incident, by
liquidating Union Carbide for US$12 billion.<sup>\[109\]\[110\]</sup>
Dow quickly issued a statement saying that they had no employee by that
name—that he was an impostor, not affiliated with Dow, and that his
claims were a hoax. The BBC later broadcast a correction and an
apology.<sup>\[111\]</sup>

Jude Finisterra was actually Andy Bichlbaum, a member of the activist
prankster group The Yes Men. In 2002, The Yes Men issued a fake press
release explaining why Dow refused to take responsibility for the
disaster and started up a website, at "DowEthics.com", designed to look
like the real Dow website, but containing hoax
information.<sup>\[112\]</sup>

### Monitoring of activists

The release of an email cache related to intelligence research
organisation Stratfor was leaked by WikiLeaks on 27 February
2012.<sup>\[113\]</sup> It revealed that Dow Chemical had engaged
Stratfor to spy on the public and personal lives of activists involved
in the Bhopal disaster, including the Yes Men. E-mails to Dow
representatives from hired security analysts list the YouTube videos
liked, Twitter and Facebook posts made and the public appearances of
these activists.<sup>\[114\]</sup> Journalists, film-makers and authors
who were investigating Bhopal and covering the issue of ongoing
contamination, such as Jack Laurenson and Max Carlson, were also placed
under surveillance.<sup>\[115\]\[116\]</sup> Stratfor released a
statement condemning the revelation by Wikileaks while neither
confirming nor denying the accuracy of the reports, and would only state
that it had acted within the bounds of the law. Dow Chemical also
refrained to comment on the matter.<sup>\[117\]</sup>

Ingrid Eckerman, a member of the International Medical Commission on
Bhopal, has been denied a visa to visit India.<sup>\[118\]</sup>