472 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
472 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
In fact the “Senegalese May” was better known among students: students
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sent messages of protest from around the world to the government of
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Senghor which was suppressing their fellow African comrades. We should
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also note that the University of Dakar was the only university in the
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colonies of French West Africa (FWA) until after “independence”, which
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explains the presence within it of a significant number of foreign
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African students.
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The organs of the bourgeois press had different interpretations of what
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caused the outbreak of the May movement in Dakar. For some, like Afrique
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Nouvelle (Catholic), it was the crisis in education that was the root
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cause of the movement. Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens (for the
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business community) considered it an extension of the movement in
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France. Jeune Afrique pointed out the connection between the student
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political unrest and the social unrest of wage earners.
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There was another point of view that made a connection between this
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movement and the economic crisis: it came from Abdoulaye Bathily, one of
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the oldest participants in the famous revolt when he was then a student;
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later, in his role of researcher, he would make a general appraisal of
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the events of “May in Dakar.” We will quote him a lot in this article
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for his testimonies from inside the events.
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The Sequence of Events “May 1968 has gone down in history characterised
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across the world by the massive social upheaval in which students and
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high school pupils were the spearhead. In Africa, Senegal was very
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clearly the theatre for the university and high school protests. Many
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contemporary observers concluded that the events in Dakar were nothing
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more than an extension to May 68 in France \[...\] Having participated
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directly, and at the highest level in the students’ struggle in Dakar,
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in May 68, this thesis has always appeared to me to be wrong. \[...\]
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The explosion of May 68 was undoubtedly fostered by a particularly tense
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social climate. It was the culmination of an unprecedented agitation by
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employees in the towns, the unsatisfactory national economic indicators
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from the continued French rule, and members of the bureaucracy
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disgruntled that the technical advisers were in control of the state.
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The agricultural crisis also contributed to the growing tension in the
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towns and in Dakar, notably from the influx from the rural areas
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\[...\]. The memorandum of the Union Nationale des Travailleurs de
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Senegal \[UNTS\] on May 8th calculated that purchasing power had
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declined by 92.4% since 1961.”\[2\]
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So, this was the context in which Dakar, between May 18th and June 12th,
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also experienced a “May 68” which almost definitely undermined the
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pro-French regime of Senghor with wildcat general strikes by the
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students and then by the workers, before the government stepped in to
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end the movement, with the police and military imposing a brutal
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clampdown and with French imperialism providing critical support.
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The “Senegalese May” had been preceded by several clashes with the
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Senghor government, especially between 1966 and 1968, when students
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organised demonstrations in support of “national liberation” struggles
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and against “neo-colonialism” and “imperialism”.
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Similarly, there were “warning strikes” in high schools. Students at the
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high school in Rufisque (a suburb of Dakar) walked out of lectures on
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26th March 1968 following disciplinary measures taken against a student.
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The movement lasted three weeks and the agitation and protests against
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the government spread to schools across the region.
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The trigger for the movement The movement of May 1968 was initially
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sparked off by the decision by the government of President Senghor to
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cut the number of monthly instalments of student grants from 12 to 10
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per year, and by so doing to greatly reduce the spending on these,
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citing “the difficult economic situation facing the country”.
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“The news of the government decision spread like wildfire on the campus,
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causing widespread anxiety and provoking a general feeling of revolt. It
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was the only topic of conversation on the campus. Upon election, the new
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executive committee of the Democratic Union of Senegalese students
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\[UDES\] started to campaign over student grants, amongst students in
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the high schools and also with the trade unions.”\[3\]
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Indeed, after this government announcement there were constant protests
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and the opposition to the government grew, especially on the eve of the
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elections that were denounced by the students, as the heading of one of
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their leaflets demonstrates: “From the economic and social situation in
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Senegal to the eve of the election farce on February 25th...” The
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agitation continued and on May 18th students decided to announce a
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“general strike” following the failure of negotiations with the
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government about their conditions, and there was a massive strike in all
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the faculties.
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Galvanised by the clear success of the strike, and angered by the
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government’s refusal to meet their demands, the students called an
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unlimited general strike and a boycott of exams from May 27th. Already,
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before this, meetings were taking place on campus and in high schools
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generally; in brief, this was a showdown with the government. For its
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part, the government seized control of all the official media and
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announced a series of repressive measures against the strikers, hoping
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to stir some opposition from the workers and peasants to the students,
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who it labelled “privileged”. And the Senegalese Progressive Union
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(Senghor's party) tried to denounce the “anti-nationalist position” of
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the students’ movement, but without any real echo; quite the contrary,
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the government campaigns only increased the anger of the students and
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gave rise to workers’ solidarity and won sympathy from the public.
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“The meetings of the Student Union of Dakar (UED) were the focal point
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of the agitation on the campus. They attracted a considerable number of
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students, pupils, teachers, unemployed youths, political activists and,
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of course, many government spies. Over time, they were the barometer
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indicating the size of the political and social protest movement. Each
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meeting was a sort of gathering of the Senegalese opposition and of
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those on campus from other countries. The interventions were punctuated
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by pieces of revolutionary music from around the world.”\[4\]
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Indeed, a real showdown was on the cards. In fact, at midnight on May
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27th, students awoke to hear the sound of boots and to see the arrival
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en masse of police who cordoned off the campus. Then a crowd of students
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and pupils gathered and converged on the residential quarters to mount
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picket lines.
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By encircling the university campus with police, the government hoped to
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prevent any movement onto or out of the campus.
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“So, some of their colleagues were deprived of meals and others of their
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beds because as the UED repeatedly said, the social conditions were such
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that many of their colleagues (those without grants) ate in the town or
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slept there from the lack of housing on campus. Even medical students
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who treated patients in the hospital would be stuck in the town along
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with the other students in a medical emergency. It was a typical example
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of where academic freedoms were violated.”\[5\]
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On May 28th, during an interview with the rector and the deans of the
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university, the UED demanded the lifting of the police cordon, while
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university authorities required students to make a declaration within 24
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hours “to declare that the strike is not aimed at overthrowing the
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Senghor government”. Student organisations responded that they were not
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allied with any specific regime and that within the time granted to
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them, they wouldn’t be able to consult their members. After this, the
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President of the Government ordered the closure of all the academic
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institutions.
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“The anti-riot squad, reinforced by the police, went on the offensive
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and entered the living quarters one after the other. They had orders to
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remove the students by all means possible. So with truncheons, rifle
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butts, bayonets, tear gas grenades, sometimes crazed, smashing doors and
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windows, these henchmen entered the students’ rooms looking for them.
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The riot squads and the police behaved just like looters. They stole
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what they could and smashed up things blocking their path, tore up
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clothes, books and notebooks. Pregnant women were abused and workers
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mistreated. Married women and children were beaten in their homes. There
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was one death and many wounded (around one hundred) according to
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official figures.”\[6\]
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The explosion The brutality of the government's reaction led to an
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outburst of solidarity and sympathy for the student movement. There was
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strong disapproval throughout the capital of the regime’s brutal
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behaviour and against police cruelty and the confinement of large
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numbers of students. On the eve of May 29th all the ingredients were
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present for a social conflagration because things had reached fever
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pitch for the students and salaried workers.
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The high school students were already massively involved in the “warning
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strikes” of March 26th, and on May 18th were the first to start an
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indefinite strike. After this the university students and those in the
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high schools started to link up. And one after the other, all the
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institutions in secondary education declared a total and unlimited
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strike, formed struggle committees and called for demonstrations with
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the university students.
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Alarmed by the increased numbers of young people joining the protests,
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on the same May 29th President Senghor made an announcement to the media
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of an indefinite closure of all learning establishments (high schools
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and colleges) in the vicinity of Dakar and St. Louis, and called on
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parents to keep their children at home. But with little success.
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“The closure of the university and the high schools only increased
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social tension. University students who had escaped the police cordons,
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high school students and other young people began erecting barricades in
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neighbourhoods like Medina, Grand Dakar, Nimzat, Baay Gainde, Kip Koko,
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Usine Ben Talli, Usine Nyari Talli, etc.. On the 29th and 30th
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particularly, young demonstrators occupied the main streets of Dakar.
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Vehicles belonging to government officials and the leading personalities
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of the regime were tracked down. It was rumoured that many ministers
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were forced to abandon their official cars, famous cars like the Citroen
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DS 21. In people’s eyes, and those of the university and high school
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students in particular, this type of official vehicle symbolised ‘the
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lavish lifestyles of the comprador and political-bureaucratic
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bourgeoisie.’”\[7\]
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Faced with growing combativity and the escalation of the movement, the
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government reacted by tightening its repressive measures, extending them
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to the whole population. So, the government issued a decree that from
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May 30th all public buildings (cinemas, theatres, cabarets, restaurants,
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bars) would close day and night until further notice; and also, that
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meetings, demonstrations and gatherings of more than 5 persons would be
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prohibited.
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A workers’ general strike Faced with these martial measures and with
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continued police brutality against young people in struggle, the whole
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country stirred and the revolt intensified, this time with more of the
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salaried working class becoming involved. It was at this point that the
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official union apparatus, notably the National Union of Workers of
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Senegal, the umbrella body for several unions, decided to make its play
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to avoid being bypassed by the rank and file workers.
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“The rank and file unions pressed for action. On May 30th, at 18.00
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hours, the regional union, UNTS de Cap-Vert (a region of Dakar),
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following a joint meeting with the National headquarters of UNTS,
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announced plans for an indefinite strike from midnight on May
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30th.”\[8\]
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Given the difficult situation facing his regime, President Senghor
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decided to address himself to the nation and spoke threateningly to the
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workers urging them to disobey the call for a general strike, while
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accusing the students of being “under a foreign influence”. But despite
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the real threats of the government to requisition certain categories of
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workers, the strike was well supported in both the public and the
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private sectors.
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General assemblies were planned in the labour union hall for 10am on May
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31st, in which the invited strikers’ delegations would decide the next
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steps for the movement.
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“But the police had cordoned the area off. At 10 o’clock the order to
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attack the workers inside the hall was given. Doors and windows were
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smashed, cabinets pulled apart, records destroyed. Tear gas and
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truncheons overwhelmed the most foolhardy workers. In response to the
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police brutality, the workers in amongst the students and the lumpen
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proletariat, attacked vehicles and shops, some of which were torched.
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The next day Abdoulaye Diack, Secretary of State for Information,
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revealed to reporters that 900 people were arrested in the labour union
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hall and the surrounding area. Among these, there were 36 union leaders
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including 5 women. In fact, during the week of crisis, no less than
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3,000 people were arrested. Some union leaders were deported \[...\].
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These actions only heightened popular indignation and readied the
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workers for the fight.”\[9\]
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Indeed, directly after this press conference when the government’s
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spokesman gave statistics about the victims, the strikes, demonstrations
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and riots were intensifying and so the bourgeoisie decided to call a
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halt.
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“The unions, allied to the government and the employers, felt it was
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necessary to make concessions to the workers to avoid them adopting a
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hard line, since in the demonstrations they had been able to sense their
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power.”\[10\]
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Therefore, on June 12th, after a series of meetings between government
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and unions, President Senghor announced an 18 point agreement to end the
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strike with a 15% increase in wages. Accordingly, the movement
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officially ended on that date, which did not prevent further discontent
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and the resurgence of other social movements, because the strikers were
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really suspicious regarding any promises from the Senghor government.
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And, in fact, just weeks after signing the agreement to end the strike,
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social movements were spreading more than ever, with some lively
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episodes, right up until the early 1970s.
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Ultimately, it is worth noting the state of disarray in which the
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Senegalese government found itself at the height of its confrontation
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with the “May movement in Dakar”:
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“From June 1st to 3rd, it seemed that there was a power vacuum. The
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isolation of the government was expressed in the inertia of the ruling
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party. Faced with the scale of the social explosion, the party machine
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of the UPS (Sengho’s party) did not react. The UPS Students’ Federation
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was happy to covertly distribute leaflets against the UDES in the early
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stages. This situation was all the more striking since the UPS had
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boasted three months earlier about having won a landslide victory in the
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parliamentary and presidential elections in Dakar on February 25th,
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1968. But now it was unable to provide an acceptable response to what
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was happening.
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“Rumour had it that ministers were holed up in the administrative
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building, the seat of the government, and that senior party and state
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officials were hiding in their homes. This was very strange behaviour
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from party leaders who claimed to have a majority in the country. At one
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moment, the rumour ran that President Senghor had taken refuge in the
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French military base at Ouakam. These rumours were made even more
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believable following the news in Dakar that De Gaulle had “fled” to
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Germany on May 29th.”\[11\]
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Indeed, the Senegalese government was truly reeling and in this context,
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it was quite symptomatic that de Gaulle and Senghor were seeking the
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protection and support of their respective armies at the same time.
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Moreover, at the time, other more persistent “rumours” clearly indicated
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that the French army had forcibly intervened to prevent the protesters
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marching on the presidential palace, inflicting several deaths and
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injuries.
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Let’s also recall that the Senegalese government did not only use its
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normal guard-dogs, namely the police, to bring an end to the movement
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but that it also had recourse to the more reactionary forces like the
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religious leaders and peasants from the remote countryside. At the
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height of the movement, on May 30th and 31st, the leaders of the
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religious cliques were invited to use media day and night by Senghor to
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condemn the strike in the strongest terms and to urge the workers to go
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back to work.
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As for the peasants, the government tried unsuccessfully to turn them
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against the strikers, by making them come to town to support
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pro-government demonstrations.
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“The recruiters had led the peasants to believe that Senegal had been
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invaded from Dakar by a nation called ‘Tudian’ (student) and that they
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were being called on to defend the country. Groups of these peasants
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were actually located in the alleyways of Centennial (now Boulevard
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General de Gaulle) with their weapons (axes, machetes, spears, bows and
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arrows).
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“But they very quickly realised that they had been taken for a ride.
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\[...\] The young people dispersed them with stones and divided up their
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food amongst themselves. \[...\] Others were vilified on their way to
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Rufisque. In any event, the riot revealed the fragility of the political
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standing of the UPS and of the regime in the urban areas, particularly
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in Dakar.”\[12\]
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Undoubtedly, the government of Senghor would utilise every means
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available, including the most obscure, to bring the social uprising
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against its regime to an end. However, to permanently extinguish the
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fire, the most effective weapon for the government could only be that in
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the hands of Doudou Ngome. He played his part at the time as the leader
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of the main union, the UNTS. He would “negotiate” the terms for
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smothering the general strike. Moreover, as a thank you, President
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Senghor would make him a minister a few years later. It’s another
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illustration of the strike-breaking role of the unions who, in cahoots
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with the former colonial power, definitely saved Senghor’s neck.
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The high-school students’ role in starting the movement “The high
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schools in the Cap-Vert region, ‘aroused’ by the strike at Rufisque High
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School in April, were the first to spring into action. These students
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were especially quick to take to the streets as they saw themselves,
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like the university students, as victims of the education policy of the
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Government and were concerned in particular by the cut-backs in the
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grants. As future university students themselves, they were actively
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involved in the struggle of the UDES. The strike spread rapidly from
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Dakar to other secondary schools around the country from May 27th
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\[...\] The leadership of the students’ movement was very unstable, and
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from one meeting to the next, the delegates, and there were many,
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changed. \[...\] An important nucleus of very active strikers also drew
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the attention of the teacher training college for young girls at Thies.
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Some student leaders even moved to the old town and coordinated the
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strike from there. Subsequently, a national committee of the high
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schools and other secondary education colleges in Senegal was formed,
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becoming a sort of general staff of the student movement.”\[13\]
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Here the author is describing the active role of the high-school
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students in the mass movement of May 68 in Senegal, in particular the
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way the struggle was organised with general assemblies and
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‘co-ordinations’. Indeed, in every high school, there was a struggle
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committee and general assembly with an elected and revocable leadership.
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The magnificent involvement of the high school students, both male and
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female, was highly significant as this was the first time in history
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that this part of the youth were mobilised in large numbers to protest
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against the new ruling bourgeoisie. If the starting point of the
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movement was a solidarity action with one of their comrades, victimised
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by the school authority, the high-school students, like the other
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students and workers, also saw the need to fight against the effects of
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the capitalist crisis that the Senghor government wanted to make them
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pay for.
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Western imperialism comes to Senghor’s aid At the imperialist level,
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France was keeping close track of the crisis that the events of 1968 had
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given rise to, and for good reason; it had a lot invested in Senegal.
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Indeed, apart from its military bases (sea, air and land) located around
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Dakar, Paris had appointed a “technical advisor” to each ministry and to
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the president’s office to steer the policies of the Senegalese
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government in a direction that would clearly serve its own interests.
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In this respect, we can recall that before being one of the best
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“pupils” of the Western bloc, Senegal was for a long time the
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principal historic bastion of French colonialism in Africa (from 1659 to
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1960) and for this reason Senegal participated with its foot soldiers in
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all the wars that France was involved in around the world, from the
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conquest of Madagascar in the 19th century, to both World Wars and the
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wars in Indochina and Algeria. It was therefore only natural for France
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to use its role as “local gendarme” of the Western imperialist bloc in
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Africa to protect Senghor's regime using every means at its disposal:
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“In the aftermath of the events of 68, France intervened with support
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from its EEC partners to rescue the Senegalese regime. The State was not
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able to meet its debts following negotiations that took place on June
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12th. In a speech on June 13th, President Senghor said that the
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agreement with the unions would cost 2 thousand million francs (local
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currency). A week after these negotiations, the European Development
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Fund (EDF) agreed to the stabilisation fund for groundnut prices with an
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advance of 2 thousand and 150 million francs (local currency) ‘intended
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to mitigate the effects of the fluctuations in world prices during the
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1967/68 campaign’. \[...\] But even the U.S., which had been taken to
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task by the President Senghor during the events, participated with the
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other Western countries in restoring a peaceful social climate in
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Senegal. Indeed, the U.S. and Senegal signed an agreement for the
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construction of 800 housing units for middle income groups for a total
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of 5 million dollars.”\[14\]
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It is clear that in doing this the main issue for the Western bloc was
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avoiding the collapse of Senegal and its defection into the enemy camp
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(that of China and Eastern Bloc).
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Thus, having regained control of the situation, President Senghor
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immediately set off to visit the “friendly countries”, and Germany,
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amongst them, welcomed him to Frankfurt, just after the bloody
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suppression of the strikers in Senegal. This welcome in Frankfurt is
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also highly instructive because Senghor went there to get help and to be
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“decorated” by a country that was a leading member of NATO. On the other
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hand, this visit was an opportunity for the German students, for whom
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“Danny the Red” Cohn-Bendit was the mouthpiece, to show support in the
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streets for their Senegalese comrades, as the newspaper Le Monde
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reported, 25/09/1968:
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“Daniel Cohn-Bendit was arrested on Sunday in Frankfurt during
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demonstrations against Mr Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal, and he
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was charged on Monday afternoon (along with 25 of his comrades) by a
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local German magistrate of inciting riot and illegal assembly...”
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In their struggle, the Senegalese students would also receive support
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from their comrades overseas who often occupied the Senegalese embassies
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and consulates. News of the movement in Senegal reverberated throughout
|
||
Africa:
|
||
|
||
“In Africa, there were further repercussions from the events in Dakar
|
||
owing to the actions of the national unions (student unions). On
|
||
returning to their home countries African students, expelled from the
|
||
University of Dakar, continued campaigning. \[...\] The African
|
||
governments of that time regarded the students from Dakar with
|
||
suspicion. And in so far as most of them showed their irritation at the
|
||
way their nationals were expelled, they also feared the contagion of
|
||
their country with the ‘subversion arriving from Dakar and
|
||
Paris’.”\[15\]
|
||
|
||
Actually, almost all African regimes feared “contagion” and “subversion”
|
||
from May 68, starting with Senghor himself who had to resort to violent
|
||
repressive measures against the educated youth. Hence, many of the
|
||
strikers experienced prison or forced military service not dissimilar to
|
||
deportation into military camps. And equally, large numbers of foreign
|
||
African students were expelled en masse; some of whom were ill-treated
|
||
on their return home.
|
||
|
||
Some lessons from the events of May 68 in Dakar “May in Dakar” was
|
||
unquestionably one of the links in the chain of a worldwide May 68. The
|
||
significance of the involvement of the Western imperialist bloc in
|
||
saving the Senegalese regime was an indication of the power of the
|
||
movement of the workers and the university and high school students.
|
||
|
||
But over and above the radicalism of the student action, the movement of
|
||
May 68 in Senegal, with its working class involvement, came about
|
||
through a return to the spirit and the form of the proletarian struggle
|
||
that the working class of the colony of French West Africa had achieved
|
||
at the beginning of the 20th century, but which the African bourgeoisie
|
||
in the government had succeeded in stifling, especially during the early
|
||
years of “national independence”.
|
||
|
||
May 68 was thus more than an opening to another world breaking with the
|
||
counter-revolutionary period; it was a moment of awakening for many
|
||
protagonists, especially the youth. Through their involvement in the
|
||
fight against the forces of the national capital, they exposed a number
|
||
of myths and illusions, including the “end of the class struggle” under
|
||
the pretext there was no antagonism between the (African) working class
|
||
and the (African) bourgeoisie.
|
||
|
||
It should also be noted the police repression and imprisonment of
|
||
thousands of strikers proved insufficient for achieving victory over the
|
||
social movement; it also had to be lured into the union trap and the
|
||
intervention of France and the Western bloc in support of their
|
||
“favourite junior partner”. But it was also necessary to meet the
|
||
demands of students and workers with a large increase in pay.
|
||
|
||
The basic thing is that the strikers did not “sleep” for long after the
|
||
agreement that ended the strike because the following year, the working
|
||
class took up the fight more than ever participating fully in the wave
|
||
of international struggles that May 68 set in train.
|
||
|
||
Finally, it is noteworthy that this movement used truly proletarian
|
||
modes of organisation, proletarian strike committees and general
|
||
assemblies, strongly demonstrating self-organisation; in short, a clear
|
||
taking of the struggles into their own hands by the strikers. This is
|
||
one specific aspect that characterises the struggle of a fraction of the
|
||
world working class, fully involved in the battle to come for the
|
||
communist revolution. |