142 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
142 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
The **Sakhalin Anti-Oil Movement** was an
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[indigenous](Indigenism "wikilink") and
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[environmentalists](Environmentalism "wikilink") against the extraction
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of [oil](Fossil_Fuels "wikilink") in Sakhalin,
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[Russia](Russia "wikilink") from [2005 to
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2007](Timeline_of_Libertarian_Socialism_in_Northern_Asia "wikilink").
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## Background
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Sakhalin is an island of the coast of eastern Russia and northern
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[Japan](Japan "wikilink"). It is home to many indigenous people, and
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contains large oil and gas reserves, extracting fossil fuels from the
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island since 1997, and work on Sakhalin II (the largest oil and gas
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project in the world) in 1999.
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Many indigenous groups in the area, including the Nivkh community,
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Sakhalin Evenks, the Sakhalin Nanai community, and the Uilta community,
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wanted an evaluation of potential ecological damage and a cultural
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impact assessment, as well as a compensation fund based on such an
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assessment. Most of the groups in the area rely upon reindeer pastures,
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rivers, and bays in order to subsist, and claimed that these had been
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damaged by the oil extraction projects. Oil companies had destroyed
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reindeer pastures and forests, as well as depleted fish populations via
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offshore drilling. This left traditional handicrafts and jobs with the
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oil companies themselves as the few sources of livelihoods in the area.
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In October of 2004, a regional assembly of indigenous peoples decided
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that direct action was necessary because the oil companies refused to
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provide concrete project information or to engage in real dialogue with
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indigenous peoples’ organizations. So in January 2005, the Sakhalin
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Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, including the Nivkh
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communities, Sakhalin Evenks, and the Sakhalin Nanaytsy community, as
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well as the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
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(RAIPON) planned two picket lines (one source says RAIPON, backed by the
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World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace organized and scheduled the
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protests). They planned to shut down the Exxon Sakhalin I and the
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Shell/Sakhalin Energy Sakhalin II facilities. Shell-led Sakhalin Energy
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and Exxon Oil and Gas sent representatives to indigenous peoples’
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settlements to persuade them not to participate in the protest. About 30
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indigenous people were involved with different oil extraction projects
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at the time. Company representatives threatened to fire these employees
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if they chose to participate in the protests. Oil company security
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squads were also sent to the Nogliki settlement to deter potential
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protesters. Regardless, organizers planned to begin protests in the
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Nogliki region of Sakhalin, while calling on oil companies to respond
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legally and ethically.
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On January 20, 2005, approximately 250 protesters marched through the
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streets of the Venskoye settlement Nogliksky and held a meeting on the
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sacred ground of the Nivkh. Representatives of the oil and gas companies
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were invited, but did not attend. On January 21 and 22, the groups
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picketed and blockaded the Exxon project, and then the Shell project on
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January 23. 300 people attended the action, mostly comprised of the
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Evenk, Nivkh, and Uilta indigenous groups. Political party
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representatives and Sakhalin nongovernmental organizations such as Green
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Patrol and Sakhalin Environment Watch also attended. Protesters held
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banners with slogans such as “We demand a cultural impact assessment,”
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“Stop the politics damaging the life of Sakhalin’s Evenks,” and “Fish
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are our Wealth\!” One banner quoted Russian president Vladimir Putin
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saying “Oil company people, you have to remember on whose land you are
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working – Putin, Salekhard, 2004.”
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Protesters also built bonfires and did traditional dances while in the
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picket line. Some Exxon trucks attempted another route to the facility,
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but one was overturned because the road was not meant for such large
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vehicles (there were no injuries). The overturned truck stopped any
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traffic that tried to reach the facility via the other route. This
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happened 15 minutes after protesters participated in a Nivkh shamanic
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ritual at the protest site. Some protesters took this as a sign from the
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Nivkh gods. They also sent copies of the memorandum of demands to
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regional and federal authorities (including President Putin), as well as
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to the oil and gas companies involved. They demanded full inclusion in
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all future decision-making processes with regards to the protection of
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their land, traditional way of life, and socio-economic development. The
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picket lines lasted through the 23rd.
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Protesters held a press conference on January 24 in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, a
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main city on Sakhalin. It was covered by much local, national, and
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international press, but did not receive much television coverage
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because there was a national protest over welfare benefits on the same
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day.
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Right before the protest, RAIPON-Sakhalin, the officially recognized
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nongovernmental organization to represent the indigenous peoples, was
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determined illegitimate by the Judicial Department. So, in March of
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2005, organizers worked with indigenous peoples in Sakhalin to draft a
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charter for a new group: “The Union of Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin.”
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They held elections to choose representatives for negotiations with the
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gas and oil companies.
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By June, oil and gas companies had still made no moves to recognize the
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demands of the indigenous peoples, so protesters staged a second round
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of protests at the end of June, coordinated with actions in London,
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Moscow, and New York. On June 28, protesters closed down the road to the
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Shell project once again, and closed down the road to the Exxon facility
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on June 29.
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Still, oil companies largely ignored the protesters’ demands. At that
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time, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was
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considering helping to finance Shell’s Sakhalin II project. The EBRD
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opened up a 120-day comment period that would end on April 21, 2006,
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after which they would come to a decision on whether or not to finance
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the project. Hence, organizers expanded the campaign focus to pressure
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the EBRD to deny Sakhalin II’s funding. In December of 2005, management
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of the EBRD tried to convince the bank’s directors that the Sakhalin II
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project met environmental and social standards.
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On January 28, 2006, over 300 protesters blockaded Sakhalin Energy’s
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giant liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant that was part of the Sakhalin II
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project. The local government directly supported the action. Ivan
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Malakhov, the governor of Sakhalin gave a speech at the protest site in
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support of the protesters. Banners at the protest read: “Say NO to EBRD
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financing\!”, “EBRD hands off Sakhalin II,” “Demanding re-calculation of
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environmental damage\!”, “Fish are the main wealth of Sakhalin,” and
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“Demanding transparency for public control.” Protesters also put
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together two petitions, one of which was sent to the Russian government,
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the Sakhalin governor and Sakhalin Energy CEO Ian Craig, demanding a
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recalculation of the damage to fish stocks, as well as for the
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establishment of a sanitary protection zone extending 3.5 km around each
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project, instead of the existing 1 km zone. The second petition went to
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the Board of Directors of the EBRD. This petition demanded that the EBRD
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not fund Sakhalin II. Then on February 2, Governor Malakhov met with
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officials from the EBRD to discourage them from investing in Sakhalin
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II.
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At this point, protesters had made some gains. Sakhalin Energy issued a
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statement containing a plan to reduce the project’s environmental
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impact, but said that further demonstrations would not “resolve the
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concerns” of the protesters or facilitate dialogue. Sakhalin Energy was
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also said to be working on a long-term Indigenous Peoples Development
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Plan, though it was never released, if they indeed completed the study.
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Additionally, a sacred site in the north part of the island was cleared
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of oil extraction equipment and reseeded (the exact impetus for this is
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unknown).
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## Results
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The project was closed in 2007 by the Rostekhnadzor, the state agency
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responsible for industrial safety and environmental protection suspended
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the construction of the Sakhalin II onshore pipelines because Shell was
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constructing them through an active seismic fault. Funding was later
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withdrawn from the amount of delays, making it ambiguous if the campaign
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was effective. |